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The Eligibility of Claimants to Commence Derivative Litigation on Behalf of China’s Joint Stock 
Limited Companies  
 
                                                           Jingchen Zhao & Shuangge Wen 
 
Abstract 
 
Derivative actions in modern company law play a crucial role in promoting the efficiency of corporate law and the soundness 
of corporate governance. However, since China’s inauguration of derivative action in 2005, now enshrined in Section 151 of 
Chinese Company Law (CCL) 2013(revised in 2013 and enforced on 1st March 2014), there have been complications 
surrounding the eligibility of shareholder claimants in terms of taking derivative action, especially for joint stock limited 
liability companies (JSLCs). Under Article 151 of the CCL 2013, JSLCs are treated differently from limited liability 
companies (LLCs). Standing requirements are imposed on shareholders in JSLCs, whereas any shareholder has the right to 
sue in LLCs. Shareholders who intend to bring derivative action are required to separately or jointly hold 1% or more of the 
company’s shares for 180 consecutive days. These prescribed thresholds prevent trivial or malicious suits, but may also hinder 
the effective enforcement of the mechanism. Through doctrinal, comparative and empirical analyses of the eligibility of 
claimants to bring derivative action in JSLCs, the article puts forward proposals for how the effectiveness of the regime in 
China can be improved in hope of increasing the effectiveness of the mechanism and the enforcement of company law, and 
contributing to the fairness and accountability of corporate governance. It is argued that future revision of laws concerning 
claimants’ eligibility should not only make sure that reasonable shareholders are able to use the mechanism, but also take 
into account current commercial practices, stock market structures and government policy.  
 
                                            
 Professor in Commercial Law, Nottingham Trent University, UK. 
 Professor in Law, Jilin University, P.R. China; Member of the Institute of International Shipping and Trade Law, Swansea 
University, UK. 
2 
 
 
1. Introduction  
Initially derived from English and US law, derivative action works as an exception to the rule that defines 
the company itself as the proper person or legal entity to bring action when seeking redress against 
wrongdoers who are in control of the company.1 It is a tool to enable individual shareholders to act in 
support of the rights and interests of the company. The scheme has been seen as a useful tool to both 
mitigate the dominant power of controlling shareholders and curb opportunistic behaviours by the board 
of directors.2 It provides that if a shareholder can establish a case in which the action harming the 
company constitutes a fraud on the company and where the wrongdoers control the company, he or she 
will be permitted to take proceedings which derive from the company’s right to institute proceedings. 
Different from direct minority protection mechanisms such as unfair prejudice remedies3 or winding ups4 
in common law countries or their equivalents, the process was designed to protect the company, allowing 
shareholders to bring an action on behalf of the company. Shareholders may benefit from successful 
recoveries since the value of shares will increase pro rota as the assets of the company improve in value.5 
This protection mechanism has since been inserted in legislation in a number of countries with developed 
markets, such as the UK, Hong Kong,6 Australia,7 Canada,8 Japan,9 New Zealand10 and Singapore,11 as 
well as in countries with emerging markets including India,12 Brazil13 and Russia.14  
                                            
1 The rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461 provides a negative answer to the question of whether an individual shareholder is 
able to bring a complaint before the court if an irregularity has been committed in the course of a company’s affairs, or if some 
wrong has been done to the company. This is also the case in China. Article 119 of the Civil Procedure Law 2012 in China 
required the claimant to have direct interest in the litigation. Following this, a corporate victim is supposed to sue a wrongdoing 
director or senior officers. However, in a number of cases, this civil procedure rule fails to give remedy for the corporate victim, 
while it is difficult for the legal representatives of the companies or members of the board of directors to bring a lawsuit against 
directors or senior officers. Therefore, it is crucial to enable qualified shareholders to bring derivative law suits on behalf of a 
corporate victim. In common law, the decisions on whether legal proceedings are to be instituted or not is the decision of the 
company’s board of directors according to English law, but the board may decide not to commence proceedings on behalf of the 
company. The legal regime is now codified in the UK Companies Act 2006 and was enforced from October 2007 for the 
purpose of simplifying and modernising the old company law to improve its accessibility, since the common law system lacked 
clarity and was inaccessible. Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies: Report on a Reference under section 3(1)(e) of the Law 
Commissions Act 1965 (Law Com No 246, Cm 3769) (London, Stationery Office, 1997), 7 and para 6.4; see also Sections 206–
264 of CA 2006. 
2 S. Tenev & Chunlin Zhang with Brefort, Loup, Corporate Governance and Enterprise Reform in China: Building the Institutions of Modern 
Markets (World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, Washington, DC 2002) p.149. 
3 See Section 994 Companies Act 2006; O’Neill v Phillips [1999] 1 WLR 1092. 
4  See Section 122(1) (g) and Section 124(1) Insolvency Act 1986; Re J E Cade & Son Ltd [1991] BCC 360; Re Thomas Brinsmead 
& Sons Ltd [1897] 1 Ch 406; Re Yenidje Tobacco Co [1916] 2 Ch 426. 
5 Z. Zhang, ‘Making the Shareholder Derivative Action Happen in China: How should Lawsuits be Funded?’ (2008) 38 Hong Kong 
Law Journal 523 at 526. 
6 See Section 731-738 of New Companies Ordinance 2012 (Cap 622) (the Section commenced operation on 3 March 2014). 
7  Part 2F.1A of the Corporations Act 2001; see L. Thai, ‘Australian Statutory Derivative Action – Defects, Alternative 
Approaches and Potential for Law Reform’ in C.B. Picker & G. Seidman (eds), The Dynamism of Civil Procedure – Global Trends and 
Developments (Heidelberg: Springer 2016) 237. 
8 See Canadian Business Corporations Act 1985 S.232 and S.242; see also B. Cheffins, ‘Reforming the Derivative Action: The 
Canadian Experience and British Prospects’ (1997) 2 Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review 227 at 234; D. H. Peterson & M. J 
Cumming, Shareholder Remedies in Canada, (2nd edn, LexisNexis 2009). 
9 See Articles 847–848, Japanese Company Law 2005; see also H. Oda, ‘Shareholder’s Derivative Action in Japan’ (2011) 8 
European Company and Financial Law Review 334. 
10 See Companies Act 1993 (NZ) s.165 and s.166; see also P. Prince, ‘Australia’s Derivative Action: Using the New Zealand 
Experience’ (2000) 18 Company and Securities Law Journal 493; S. Watson, ‘A Matter of Balance: The Statutory Derivative Action in 
New Zealand’ (1998) 19 Company Lawyer 236. 
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Following this trend, derivative action was introduced to China with high expectations in Article 152 of 
the 2005 CCL,15 in the form of a short provision: “the shareholders in the case of a LLC, or a shareholder 
that has independently held, or the shareholders that have held in aggregate, 1% or more of the shares of 
the company for more than 180 consecutive days in the case of a JSLC, may request in writing the board 
of supervisors, or the supervisors, in the case of a LLC without a board of supervisors, to institute 
proceedings with the people’s court; where the supervisors fall under the circumstance set forth in Article 
149 hereof, the foregoing shareholders may request in writing the board of directors, or the executive 
directors in the case of a LLC without a board of directors, to institute proceedings with the people’s 
court”. The provision was renumbered as Art. 151 but the content was wholly preserved in the 2013 
Company Law reform, remaining in full force today.  
The mechanism was adopted to address one of six major defects in the company law of 1993, 16 
functioning as part of a series of changes surrounding shareholder protection and shareholders’ rights.17 
Notwithstanding the significance of derivative action in modern China, the ability and/or eligibility of 
shareholders to bring derivative action have been largely overlooked by scholarly works in this fast-
growing nation. Indeed, analyses in the following sections reveal that despite the fact that Article 151 is a 
relatively brief and seemingly straightforward provision, a detailed examination of its nature, designated 
scope, and relevant data from securities markets concerning its practical effects, exposes major problems 
hindering its application in JSLCs. The article focuses on the eligibility issue, by addressing two of these 
problems, namely the shareholding percentage requirement and the shareholding time period requirement. 
Research on the eligibility of claimants in derivative action is significant in terms of maintaining a proper 
balance between affording disgruntled shareholders an effective remedy to seek relief, and restraining 
excessive numbers of shareholders from launching derivative suits against companies, which may lead to 
boards and management being overloaded with unnecessary lawsuits and becoming 
                                                                                                                                       
11 S.216 Companies Act 1994 (Singapore) Cap. 50; see P. Koh, ‘The Statutory Derivative Action in Singapore: A Critical and 
Comparative Examination’ (2001) 13 Bond Law Review 64; A.K. Koh, ‘Excusing Notice Under Singapore’s Statutory Derivative 
Action’ (2013) 14 Australian Journal of Asian Law 1. 
12 S.245 Companies Act 2013 (India); see also V. Khanna & U.Varottil, ‘The Rarity of Derivative Action in India: Reasons and 
Consequences’, in D.W. Puchniak, H. Baum and M. Ewing-Chow (eds), The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional 
Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012) p.369. 
13 Articles 155 and 157 Brazilian Civil Code 2002. 
14 Item 2 of Article 71 provides Russian joint stock companies 2007. 
15 This legislative amendment  came into effect on January 1, 2006. It was originally enshrined into the CCL 2005 as Article 152, 
and subsequently renumbered as Article 151 of the CCL 2013. X. Huang, ‘Shareholders Revolt: The Statutory Derivative Action 
in China’ (2009) 09 Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy 4–6; H. Huang, ‘The Statutory Derivative Action in China: 
Critical Analysis and Recommendations for Reform’ (2007) 4 Berkeley Business Law Journal 227. 
16 Fourteenth Meeting of the Tenth National People’s Congress from 25–28 of February 2005; the six defects were summed up 
by Fan and Wang. see J. Fan & J. Wang, Corporate Law 4th edn. (Beijing: Law Press 2015) p.59; they were proposed to the 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in February 2005 including the registration of companies; corporate 
governance-related issues including the rights and liability of shareholding meetings, boards of directors and supervisory boards; 
the protection of minority shareholders and creditors including a more effective derivative action system; issuing, transferring and 
listing of shares; the supervision of listed companies; and fiduciary duties and related liability of board directors and supervisors. 
17 In detail, two distinct litigation techniques have been introduced for shareholders to vindicate their interests in the company on 
occasions where the directors’ fiduciaries duties are breached by key members of the company, such as directors, supervisors, 
senior management executives and sometimes the controlling shareholders. The mechanisms include direct suits and derivative 
suits as shareholder remedies, enabling them to bring legal action against the controllers of the company in accordance with 
Sections 151 and 152 of CCL 2013. 
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distracted/discouraged from managing the company’s affairs, as well as extra workload for the Chinese 
judicial system. Almost eleven years after the enforcement of Article 151, the virtually complete lack of 
reported cases in the field18 suggests that it is time to conduct systematic research to revisit the eligibility 
of claimants in derivative actions in Chinese JSLCs, with particular regard to the fast growth of China’s 
financial markets, the increasing diversification of its investors, and the now massive group of minority 
shareholders. 
The article aims to explore whether the eligibility requirements in Section 151 hinder minority 
shareholders in JSLCs, especially listed companies, from initiating a derivative suit. The eligibility of 
shareholder claimants according to Article 151 of the CCL 2013 will be critically analysed in order to 
deliver a comprehensive picture of the rationale for the different treatment of LLCs and JSLCs, and to 
determine whether shareholders in JSLCs are truly eligible to bring derivative actions in China. After 
exposing the defects in current laws, the article will make suggestions for reforms to the current regime. 
As well as doctrinally clarifying the eligibility of shareholders in terms of raising derivative suits and filling 
the existing legal loopholes, the research is also important from an international business perspective, 
given the increasing number of foreign investors in China.19 A legal mechanism providing more effective 
remedial means for investors will make China a more attractive place for investment, in the sense that 
foreign investors will be reassured that their rights will be more substantially protected. 
The study will begin with an examination of the company law framework and legislative processes in 
China. Also, it plans to examine what other jurisdictions have sought to do in relation to shareholder 
eligibility to bring derivative actions, in order to find solutions to the problems that are encountered by 
JSLCs in China. This will involve comparative analyses of the legislations in jurisdictions such as Japan, 
Korea, the US, the UK, Germany and Taiwan, as well as empirical analyses of listed companies in China 
and their top ten shareholders. The empirical analysis of the publicly available data will assist researchers 
to work out a more sensible and internationally compatible threshold for derivative mechanism which fits 
Chinese shareholders.  
The article is structured as follows. After the introduction, the rationale for different treatments of LLC 
and JSLCs in current Chinese company law and the importance of enhancing minority shareholder 
protection in JSLCs will be examined in Part 2, based upon which their eligibility issues will be discussed 
in detail. Two interrelated issues will be addressed to explore why JSLCs are treated differently in 
derivative action – on one hand, the mechanism threshold which avoids malicious litigation considering 
the number of shareholders in JSLCs in China, and on the other hand, the significance of Chinese reform 
for more user-friendly shareholder remedy mechanisms in JSLCs. Part 3 moves on to assess whether the 
shareholding percentage threshold requirement for JSLCs embedded in Article 151 of CCL2013 is 
appropriate, enforceable and effective. In Part 4, consideration will be given to the validity and 
                                            
18 Considering the current situation, which is that only one case has been brought against JSLCs, including listed companies. 
19 It was reported that China became the largest FDI recipient in the world in 2014; see United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2015: Reforming International Investment Governance (United 
Nations) pp.4–5. It was reported that foreign firms invested $128bn in China, and $86bn in the US. 
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effectiveness of the shareholding period threshold requirement for JSLCs, also embedded in Article 151 
of CCL 2013. Part 5 goes on to present legislative experience from other jurisdictions, in hope of 
clarifying and promoting the necessity of reconsidering the issue in JSLCs in China. Finally, there are 
some concluding remarks. 
 
2. Rationale for Enquiries about the Quantity of Derivative Suits and Justification of 
Different Treatments for LLCs and JSLCs  
 
Article 151 of CCL 2013 provides a threshold requirement concerning the size of the shareholding and 
the period for which it must be held, but it only operates in relation to shareholders in JSLCs who wish to 
bring derivative actions, not to their counterparts in LLCs. Before discussing the threshold requirement in 
detail, it is important to analyse the rationale for offering different treatment to minority shareholders in 
JSLCs and LLCs in terms of bringing a derivative action. In addition, the reasons why the protection of 
shareholders in JSLCs is becoming increasingly significant will be investigated in the context of the 
transformation of Chinese corporate governance and the Chinese economy. 
 
2.1 Enquiries about the Status Quo 
Research concerning derivative action in China thus far can be roughly divided into two groups; before 
the 2006 legislative reform, research mainly focused on the rationality of transplanting a derivative action 
mechanism to the Chinese context and the preliminary construction of this regime. After the 
promulgation of the CCL 2005, the literature, based upon discussions of reported cases, tended to focus 
on the interpretation of the legislative wording and the functions of the regime.20 One presumption 
behind most research was that shareholders, including minority shareholders, Chinese shareholders would 
not hesitate in opting to use derivative action if they feel mistreated. However, even a cursory look at 
relevant legal practices would cast doubt on this presumption. As reported by the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC) 2014 annual report, only 163 cases were closed, and 158 decisions were 
made to impose sanctions involving fines and disgorgement orders due to the misconduct of directors in 
listed companies in 2014. These included 36 disclosure violation cases, 69 involving insider trading cases 
and 15 market manipulation cases. Totals of 86 and 77 cases were concluded in 2013 and 2012 
respectively.21 In detail, these cases were due to various reasons including a breach of duties owed by the 
directors, supervisors and senior managers because of the violation of laws, administrative regulations or 
                                            
20 For example, the interpretation of “shareholders that have held in aggregate” has been interpreted by M. Hu & P. Zhang, 
‘Research on Legal Application of Derivative Action in China (股东代表诉讼的法律适用研究)’ (2007) People’s Judicature人
民司法  79; on the function of the mechanism see X. Mi, ‘Analysis Of Some Important Measures To Protect Minority 
Shareholders’ Rights & Benefits In The New “Corporation Law” 评新《公司法》对小股东权益保护的几项重要举措’ (2006) 
Law Science Magazine 72. 
21 CSRC, 2014 Annual Report p.31. 
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the articles of association, losses caused to the company, and the controlling shareholder or actual 
controlling parties using their dominant position to control the company’s assets and harm the interests 
of the company. Most of these cases could have easily become reasons for minority shareholders to bring 
lawsuits on behalf of the company. However, shareholders in JSLCs in China are not currently using 
derivative action as a mechanism, even though it is a system used in public companies in many other 
jurisdictions.22 In other words, there is a great untapped potential for derivative action to be used by 
shareholders in JSCLs. 
The limited use of derivative action seems particularly acute in JSLCs.23 Cases in which shareholder(s) 
have brought derivative actions on behalf of companies have been reported in the Chinalawinfo (Bei Da 
Fa Bao) search engine since the enforcement of the 2005 Company Law.24 Purely judging from the 
number of cases identified by Huang, we agree that the derivative action mechanism has had a noticeable 
impact in China.25 However, an in-depth investigation of the corporate contexts in which the actions 
occurred suggests otherwise. The claimants in these reported cases are shareholders in LLCs only. Since 
the implementation of Article 151, there has only been one lawsuit brought by shareholders of JSLCs 
(unreported in Bei Da Fa Bao), which was subsequently accepted by the Shandong Higher People’s Court 
on 11 December 2009, 26  implying that shareholders in JSLCs were either extremely reluctant or 
encountered significant difficulties in bringing cases of litigation on behalf of their companies. As will be 
discussed, the latter seems to be the major reason: at the current time the derivative action legal 
mechanism functions as no more than window dressing or “a big disappointment”27 for shareholders in 
JSLCs in China. 
 
2.2 Treating LLCs and JSLCs Differently 
Article 2 of the CCL 2013 provides that “the term ‘companies’ refers to LLCs and companies limited by 
shares established within the territory of China pursuant to the Law (namely JSLCs)”.28 Regarding the 
investment of shareholders in China, a shareholder in a LLC can limit his liability to the equitable capital 
contribution, whereas the liability of the shareholder in a JSLC is limited to the full payment of shares for 
which he or she subscribed.29 Despite the fact that LLCs are not exclusively small and medium-sized 
                                            
22 See Section 5 of this Article. 
23 In Chinese Company Law, the limited liability company (LLC) and the JSLC are the functional equivalents of a private 
company and a public company under English law; see J. Wang, Company Law in China: Regulation of Business Organizations in a 
Socialist Market Economy (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2014) pp.50–51; see also M. Gu, Understanding Chinese Company Law (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong University Press 2006) pp.22–23. 
24‘Chinalawinfo was launched by the Legal Information Centre of Peking University and Peking University IAC Technology Co., 
Ltd. jointly as a one-stop intelligent legal information retrieval platform: Law Info China 59. 
25 H. Huang, ‘Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis’ (2012) 27 Banking and 
Finance Law Review 619 at 644. 
26 The case involves an attempt by the plaintiffs, seventy-eight shareholders of Shanlian Shangshe, to bring a derivative claim 
against the former controlling shareholder. 
27 H. Huang, ‘Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis’ (2012) 27 Banking and 
Finance Law Review 619 at 644. 
28 Equivalent of private and public companies. 
29 Article 3 CCL 2013.  
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enterprises (SMEs), the LLC form is most attractive for SMEs in China.30 Compared to LLCs, JSLCs are 
characterised by more dispersed ownership and larger sizes. There are four main differences between 
JSLCs and LLCs in China. 
First, traditionally speaking, many listed companies within the scope of JSLCs in China still constitute 
“listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs)”, and the largest shareholder normally  is the state, which 
dominates the shareholding in listed companies. It is reported that an average of 31.27% of the shares in 
these companies are held by the government.31 This ownership by the state may suggest concentrated 
shareholding as a characteristic of Chinese corporate governance in terms of shareholding structure, due 
to the dominance of state shares in China. However, a detailed investigation into the share ownership 
composition of listed companies would suggest diversity rather than concentration: individual and non-
state institutional shareholders have increased dramatically in the last ten years with 91 million gu min (the 
shareholder population) in July 2015, and an incredible 80% of urban Chinese households which are or 
were formerly investors in the equity market. 32  The dispersed share ownership makes it sensible to 
introduce eligibility provisions for JSLCs with the purpose of preventing boards of directors or the courts 
from being overloaded with lawsuits. Comparatively, LLCs must be invested in and established by no 
more than fifty shareholders.33 Shareholders in LLCs are thus more likely to have a substantial share 
ownership percentage. Indeed, an investigation reveals that fellow shareholders in Chinese LLCs are 
usually family members, relatives, colleagues or close friends.34 Shareholders in LLCs need compelling 
reasons to break these close ties and enforce their rights to bring a derivative action, considering the close 
guanxi35 (either family guanxi or friend guanxi) between shareholders and directors in LLCs.  
Second, despite the fact that shareholders in JSLCs do enjoy freedom in terms of buying and selling 
shares, it is still important and necessary for them to have comprehensive and accessible remedies. It is 
clear that dissatisfied shareholders in JSLCs could very easily leave the company by selling their shares on 
the stock markets, whereas there is no liquid market for potential share transactions in LLCs. The 
disadvantaged position of shareholders in LLCs is exacerbated by the legal requirement imposing a legal 
                                            
30 R.C. Art and M. Gu, ‘China Incorporated: The First Corporation Law of the People’s Republic of China’ (1995) 20 Yale Journal 
of International Law 273 at 292. It is claimed that China only had 10,000 joint-stock companies and 2,800 listed companies among 
77,469,000 registered companies up to January 2016; see China Industry and Commerce News, ‘Access Environment Continues 
to Improve with Stable Competitive Environment and Well-maintained Consumer Environment’ (January 14th 2015; China 
Industry & Commerce News) available via http://www.cicn.com.cn/zggsb/2016-01/14/cms81467article.shtml. 
31 Y. Thanatawee,’Ownership Structure and Dividend Policy: Evidence from China’ (2014) 6 International 
Journal of Economics and Finance 197 at 199 quoted by OECD, OECD Survey of Corporate Governance Frameworks in Asia 2017.  
32 See the report of CSDC, available via http://www.chinaclear.cn/english/en_index.shtml 
33 Article 25 CCL 2013. 
34 J. Liu, Experience of Internationalization of Chinese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: How to Make the Hybrid of 
Civil Law and Common Law Work? (2015) European Business Law Review 107 at 118–119; see also S.S. Tang, ‘Corporate Avengers 
Needs not be Angels: Rethinking Good Faith in the Derivative Action’ (2016) 16 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 471. 
35 Guanxi means close relationship in Chinese. It is, in essence, a coalition-based network of stakeholders sharing resources for 
survival, and it plays an important role in achieving business success in China. See J.H. Pac and Y.H. Wong, ‘A Model of Close 
Business Relationship in China (guanxi)’ (2001) 35 European Journal of Marketing 51; S. Ruehle, ‘Guanxi as Competitive Advantages 
during Economic Crises: Evidence from China during the Recent Global Financial Crisis’, in X. Fu (Ed.), China’s Role in Global 
Economic Recovery, (Abingdon: Routledge 2012) 64; J. Dunning and C. Kim, “The Cultural Roots of Guanxi : An Exploratory 
Study” (2007) The World Economy 329 at 333; K. Xin and J. Pearce, “Guanxi : Connections as Substitutes for Formal Institutional 
Support” (1996) 39 Academy of Management Journal 1641. 
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restriction on equity transfers in LLCs. A member must obtain the consent of at least half the other 
shareholders prior to the member selling their shares.36 Therefore, the tie between the shareholders and 
company in LLCs seems stronger, and it is less likely that shareholders will abuse the system and want to 
buy shares for the purpose of bringing a derivative action or using them to put pressure on board 
members in their the interests of shareholders. 
Third, although JSLCs are subject to more demanding reporting requirements, including promoter’s 
agreements, minutes of general meetings, minutes of the meetings of the board of directors, minutes of 
the meetings of the board of supervisors, financial and accounting reports 37  and the information 
disclosure requirements embedded within the corporate governance code for listed companies, 
information asymmetry problems between minority shareholders and corporate controllers, either as the 
result of shareholders’ limited access to information or their ignorance and/or lack of understanding of 
the available information, are still a significant issue in JSLCs. This places minority shareholders in a 
disadvantaged position in terms of triggering derivative action. 38  In terms of derivative action, 
shareholders are required to gather facts in order to evaluate whether an action should be commenced or 
to assess the strength of any potential action.39 Therefore, information is an important precondition and 
incentive for successful litigation. Minority shareholders may not have effective access to the information; 
they are likely to be limited to the information already available to the public. This may be another reason 
why a more functional and effective shareholder remedy system should be promoted in China for JSLCs 
including listed ones. More effective and user-friendly mechanisms for derivative action will facilitate 
information exchanges between shareholders who are willing to bring litigation together, and will 
encourage those shareholders who “lose hope” in derivative actions in terms of acquiring knowledge 
about the companies and becoming more concerned about the performance of the companies in a 
positive manner. 
Lastly, different requirements for derivative actions in LLCs and JSLCs mitigate different problems 
stemming from various modes of ownership and control. JSLCs in China consist of SOEs and non-SOEs. 
In non-SOEs, ownership and control are becoming separated with the purpose of transformation from 
an administrative and planned economy to a more market-oriented economy – professional directors are 
appointed for corporations just as they are in countries with industrialised and developed markets, such as 
the US or the UK, 40  where there has been encouragement of a more scattered and diversified 
shareholding structure and hence the legal systems have fostered better protection of minority 
shareholders.41 In order to promote the corporate governance of JSLCs that are non-SOEs, effective 
                                            
36 Article 72 CCL 2013. 
37 Article 90, 96, 97 CCL 2013. 
38 J. Oliver, W. Qu & V. Wise, ‘Corporate Governance: A Discussion on Minority Shareholder Protection in China’ (2014) 6 
International Journal of Economics and Finance 11 at 11. 
39 See L. Field, M. Lowry and S. Shu, ‘Does Disclosure Deter or Trigger Litigation?’ (2005) 39 Journal of Accounting & Economics 
487. 
40 A.A. Berle and G.C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: The Macmillan Corporation 1932). 
41 R. La Porta, F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Sheifer & R. Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’ (1998) The Journal of Political Economy 1113. 
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shareholders’ remedies in these companies, as one of the critical fairness goals for corporate governance, 
are key for the transformation of the economic model in China from a planned to a market economy, 
including the transformation of corporate governance from an administratively-oriented model to a more 
economic-oriented one as desired by the Chinese government. 
In SOEs, the boards of directors, namely Bureau of State Asset Management officers, are trying to 
maximise the interests of the state, who is the biggest shareholder as well as their principal. They are civil 
servants employed by the government, whose remunerations are decided by the government and their 
administrative ranking, rather than relating to the performance of the corporations they manage. These 
directors will “align their interests with the local government, whose political interests may be to preserve 
employment rather than increase the efficiency of the listed SOEs”.42 These non-economic concerns 
could lead to the trend of diverting the company’s profits or assets which may harm the economic 
interests of the company, and for that matter, the interests of the minority shareholders. Many listed 
companies, especially SOEs, do accommodate objectives other than profit maximisation, most commonly, 
administrative goals. Apart from making profits, such corporations have other more immediate 
administrative missions such as the maintenance of urban employment, other social and environmental 
purposes or various administrative tasks required by the CSRC in order to regulate China’s stock market. 
Administrative interference aims to serve the state’s interests and strategic plans by controlling or 
influencing multifarious issues of business operation. 43  The administrative approach stems from the 
government policy in maintaining a full or controlling ownership in corporations so as to achieve direct 
control of key industries such as energy, banking and telecommunications.44 Furthermore, it may entail 
direct involvement in upstream industries due to their strategic importance in sustaining the growth of 
downstream industries. 
Different corporate forms understandably entail different agency costs. As argued by Lin, two kinds of 
agency costs are particularly acute in China, namely vertical agency costs between shareholders and 
managers, and horizontal agency costs between majority shareholders and minority shareholders due to 
the vulnerability of minority shareholders and the exploration of blockers; the latter is common in 
jurisdictions with concentrated ownership jurisdictions, particularly those with widespread SOEs. 45 
Generally speaking, the incentive for SOEs to maximise the interests of other non-state shareholders is 
less distinct and strongly relies on managers taking autonomous executive actions. Inversely, effective 
protection means offered to minority shareholders in state owned JSLCs,,  would serve the dual purpose 
                                            
42 L.H. Tan & J.Y. Wang, ‘Modeling an Efficient Corporate Governance System for China’s Listed State-Owned Enterprises: 
Issues and Challenges in a Transitional Economy’ (2007) 7 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 143 at 149. 
43 H.X. Wu, ‘Accounting for the Sources of Growth in Chinese Industry 1980-2010’ in L. Song, R. Garnaut & C. Fang (eds), 
Depending Reform for China’s Long-term Growth and Development (Canberra: The Australia National University Press 2014) 431 at 432–
433. 
44  Q. Liu & Z. Lu, ‘Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in the Chinese Listed Companies: A Tunnelling 
Perspective’ (2007) 13 Journal of Corporate Finance 881 at 884; see also L.S.O. Wanderley, R. Lucian, F. Farache & J.M. de Sousa 
Filho, ‘CSR Information Disclosure on the Web: A Context-Based Approach Analysing the Influence of Country of Origin and 
Industry Sector’ (2008) 82 Journal of Business Ethics 369. 
45 S. Lin, ‘Double Agency Costs in China: A Legal Perspective’ (2012) 9 The Asian Business Lawyer 116 at 116 and 129.  
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of mitigating the conflicts of interest between shareholders and boards of directors and between majority 
shareholders (i.e. the state) and minority shareholders.46 They might be particularly helpful to those who 
invest in state-owned or -controlled JSLCs but have been mistreated in the process of corporations 
pursuing administrative goals set by the government.  
In stark contrast, in LLCs, ownership is only marginally separated from control. These kinds of 
companies typically have an ownership structure comprising several significant shareholders.47 Instead of 
various information disclosure requirements, a dialogue mechanism is normally established between the 
board of directors and the shareholders owing to their close ties.48 This dialogue will be comparatively 
easier with limited shareholder requirements and the overlap between shareholders and board members. 
In most circumstances, the board seats in a LLC are directly occupied by shareholders themselves. 
Therefore, it can be shown that LLCs and JSLCs are treated differently in China due to their different 
shareholding structures, different levels of separation of ownership and control, different levels of 
information disclosure requirements, their shareholder volume, and their different practices for issuing 
shares. The variations in the treatment of LLCs and JSLCs are necessary to avoid both malicious litigation 
and increasing the workloads of boards of directors, supervisor and the courts. Furthermore, a balance 
should be maintained between giving boards discretion to manage companies in the way that they 
consider will promote the success of the company, and monitoring mechanisms and intervention in any 
proceedings from shareholders to which the company is a party at an appropriate level. 
 
2.3 Importance of Effective Derivative Action as a Tool to Protect 
Companies’ Interests for Shareholders in JSLCs  
Derivative action is a critical mechanism, operating in the interests of companies and their shareholders to 
promote corporate governance goals such as fairness, accountability and effectiveness. After all, one issue 
that all corporate governance mechanisms attempt to address is opportunistic and abusive corporate 
behaviours by controllers of a company.49 It is expected that improved shareholder remedy schemes will 
also promote the sustainable development of the capital market. It is positive to see that a number of 
mechanisms have been introduced in China for shareholder protection purposes, such as cumulative 
voting systems, 50  guidelines 51  and notifications. 52  However, there is still room to improve minority 
                                            
46 See A. Shleifer & R. W. Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52 Journal of Finance 737. 
47 See A. Gomes & W. Novaes, ‘Multiple Large Shareholders in Corporate Governance’. Unpublished working paper, The 
Wharton School, Philadelphia, PA (1999); see also N. Attig, S.E. Ghoul & O. Guedhami, ‘Do Multiple Large Shareholders Play a 
Corporate Governance Role? Evidence from East Asia’ (2009) 32 The Journal of Financial Research 395. 
48 It is also suggested by the European Confederation of Directors’ Association (ecoDa) Corporate Governance guidance and 
Principles for Unlisted Companies in European 2015 Principle 7 that “There should be a dialogue between the board and the 
shareholders based on the mutual understanding of objectives. The board should as a whole have responsibility for ensuring that 
a satisfactory dialogue with shareholders take place.” 
49 S.S. Tang, ‘Corporate Avengers Needs not be Angels: Rethinking Good Faith in the Derivative Action’ (2016) 16 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies 471 at 473. 
50 See Article 105, CCL 2013; see also Y. Chen & J. Du, ‘Regulatory Reform of Cumulative Voting in Corporate China: Who 
were Elected and its Impact’ available via http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2556157; see also C. Xi & Y. 
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shareholder protection. The World Bank Doing Business Index provides objective measures of business 
regulations for local firms in 189 economies and selected cities at the sub-national level, and rankings are 
issued annually, with “protecting minority investors” included as one of eleven sets of indicators; whether 
shareholders can sue derivatively is a key question (with follow-up questions) for the assessment of this 
indicator. Based on the 2017 report, China ranks 123rd in this indicator, in comparison with a position of 
78th in the general ranking.53 The indicator related to minority shareholder protection is noticeably weaker 
compared with other indicators evaluating how easy and safe it is to “do business” in China.  
A number of studies have been addressing the improvement of corporate governance in response to 
problems and troublesome practices in China, with many suggestions and recommendations to improve 
various values of corporate governance;54 the protection of shareholders, including effective remedies for 
minority shareholders, have been a particularly important aspect.55 Based on the empirical report by 
Protiviti/China and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the “conflict of interests between majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders remains a major issue in the corporate governance of Chinese 
listed companies”, regarded as one of the important risk indicators.56 Other things China currently lacks 
include “a comprehensive set of legal rules that provide protection for outside investors” and “the ability 
to implement effectively the existing laws that govern the operations of corporations and the securities 
market”,57  which both hinder the provision of better remedies for shareholders in China. An effective 
derivative action mechanism for JSLCs in China is thus crucial for enhancing shareholder value, 
                                                                                                                                       
Chen, ‘Does Cumulative Voting Matter? The Case of China: An Empirical Assessment’ (2014) 15 European Business Organization 
Law Review 585. 
51 For example, the modification of the “Rules for General Meetings of Shareholders of Listed Companies and Guidelines on the 
Articles of Association of Listed Companies” which is expected to improve disclosure requirements and voting information for 
minority shareholders. 
52 In 2014, CSRC and the People’s Bank of China jointly released the Rules for Bonds Statistics and issued a notification of the 
Hirisun Case, where we also witnessed the first case to require majority shareholders to compensate minority shareholders for 
their losses caused by the misrepresentation of listed companies. This proved to be an effective way for shareholders to seek 
remedies, and a rewarding attempt at building up a compensation mechanism for minority shareholders in listed companies. 
53 World Bank Group, Doing Business 2017: Measuring Regulatory Quality and Efficiency’, 14th edn. 
54  For example, see Q. Liu, ‘Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic Effects and Institutional 
Determinants’ (2006) 52 CESifo Economic Studies 415; L.H. Tan & J.Y. Wang, ‘Modelling an Efficient Corporate Governance 
System for China’s Listed State-Owned Enterprises: Issues and Challenges in a Transitional Economy’ (2007) 7 Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies 143; Y. Gao, ‘Corporate Social Performance in China: Evidence from Large Companies’ (2009) 89 Journal of Business 
Ethics 23; H.W.C. Yeung, Chinese Capitalism in a Global Era: Towards a Hybrid Model, London: Routledge (2004); K.L.A. Lau & A. 
Young, ‘Why China Shall Not Completely Transit from a Relation Based to a Rule Based Governance Regime: A Chinese 
Perspective’ (2013) 21 Corporate Governance: An International Review 577. R. Mead, International Management: Cross-cultural Dimensions. 
Oxford: Blackwell (2005); R. Morck and B. Yeung, ‘Corporate Governance in China’ (2014) 26 Journal of Corporate Finance 20; J. 
Yang, J. Chi & M. Young, ‘A Review of Corporate Governance in China’ (2011) 25 Asian Pacific Economic Literature 15. 
55 R. Tomasic & N. Andrews, ‘Minority Shareholder Protection in China’s Top 100 Listed Companies’ (2007) 9 Australian Journal 
of Asian Law 88 at 110.  
56 Protiviti/China and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Corporate Governance Assessment Summary Report on the Top 
100 Chinese Listed Companies for 2012” 1at 9. 
57 T. Kato & C. Long, ‘CEO Turnover, Firm Performance, and Enterprise Reform in China: Evidence from Micro Data’ (2006) 
34 Journal of Comparative Economics 796 at 798; see also F. Allen, J. Qian & M. Qian, ‘Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in 
China’ (2005) 77 Journal of Financial Economics 57; F. Jiang & K.A. Kim, ‘Corporate Governance in China: A Modern Perspective’ 
(2015) 32 Journal of Corporate Finance 190; K. Pistor, C. Xu, ‘Governing Stock Markets in Transition Economies: Lessons from 
China’ (2005) 7 American Law and Economic Review 184; Q. Liu, ‘Corporate Governance in China: Current Practices, Economic 
Effects and Institutional Determinants’ (2006) 52 CESifo Economic Studies 415; H. Zou, S. Wong, C. Shum, J. Xiong & J. Yan, 
‘Controlling-minority Shareholder Incentive Conflicts and Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance: Evidence from China’ 
(2008) 32 Journal of Banking and Finance 2636. 
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cultivating the soundness of corporate governance, restoring the confidence of domestic and international 
investors and establishing the sustainable development of capital markets in China.58  
On a broad spectrum, the importance of derivative action is further evidenced in light of the rapid 
development of the stock market in China. Chinese stock exchange markets, including the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen Stock Exchanges, have grown to become the largest in Asia and the second largest globally, 
with 3,105 listed free-floating market capitalizations reaching a value of RMB 517.12 trillion by 30th 
January 2017. 59  A key characteristic of the Chinese capital markets 60  has been the extremely high 
percentage of small investors holding less than RMB 1 million (approximately 0.13 million Euro) in cash 
or share equivalent, accounting for 98.8% and 99.3% of the total number of share capital in the Shanghai 
and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges respectively.61 With large numbers of individual shareholders, the average 
turnover rate is understandably high, coming at 201.3 in 2013 and 240.3 in 2014.62 In the light of the 
booming capital market, with a daily turnover of more than RMB 1.25 trillion and a trading volume of 
1,296 million corporate clients and 3,715 million individual clients,63 packed with poorly informed and 
unsophisticated individual investors, the problems of inadequate shareholder protection are becoming 
increasingly acute for Chinese regulators.64 The rapid growth of the Chinese stock markets does require a 
more effective and rigorously monitored shareholder remedies mechanism that is fit for purpose in the 
growing financial market and for effective supervision by market participants.  
Corporate governance-wise, derivative action has been introduced to China as a supplementary means of 
restricting corporate behaviour and the power of boards of directors. Indeed, during the 2005 Company 
Law legislation process, the professionalism and competitiveness of the directors on the boards were 
severely questioned. These problems were particularly acute among directors of SOEs, given that most of 
them either were or had connections with government officials. In the eyes of the legislators, derivative 
action as a potentially functional shareholder remedy to enforce directors’ duties 65  would serve the 
purpose of enhancing corporate transparency and the accountability of boards of directors, so as to 
benefit companies and their shareholders in general. 66 Using derivative action as a legal tool may be 
                                            
58 J. Liu, ‘Experience of Internationalization of Chinese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: How to Make the Hybrid of 
Civil Law and Common Law Work?’ (2015) 26 European Business Law Review 107 at 117; D.C. Clarke, ‘Corporate Governance in 
China: An Overview’ (2003) 14 China Economic Review 494 at 502–503; S. Lin & D. Cabrelli, ‘Legal Protection for Minority 
Shareholders in China’ (2013) 8 Frontiers of Law in China 266.  
59 CSRC data January 2017; available via http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub. 
60 Analyses surrounding the high percentage of small investors was based on a 2008 Report issued by the CSRC, which has not 
provided any updated reports since that date. 
61 See China Securities Regulatory Commission, China Capital Markets Development Report 2008 p.269–270. 
62  The World Bank, Stocks Traded, Turnover Ratio of Domestic Shares (%), data available via 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/CM.MKT.TRNR. 
63 CSRC, 2014 Annual Report p.14, 21. 
64 X. Huang, ‘Shareholders Revolt: The Statutory Derivative Action in China’, Comparative Research in Law and Political 
Economy Research Paper 49/2009, p.5. 
65 F.X. Hong, ‘Director Regulation in China: The Sinonization Process’ (2011) 19 Michigan State Journal of International Law 502 at 
536–542; see R. Lee, ‘Fiduciary Duty without Equity: ‘Fiduciary Duties’ of Directors under the Revised Company Law of the 
PRC’ (2007) 47 Virginia Journal of International Law 897. 
66 See L. Chun, The Governance Structure of Chinese Firms, Heidelberg and London, Springer 2009; J. Yang, J. Chi and M. Young, ‘A 
Review of Corporate Governance in China’ (2011) Asian-Pacific Economic Literature 15; N. Rajagopalan and Y. Zhang, ‘Corporate 
Governance Reform in China and India: Challenges and Opportunities’ (2008) 51 Business Horizons 55; Y. Cheung, P. Jiang, P. 
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employed a remedy of compensation, whereas successful lawsuits may confer monetary benefits to the 
company and impose financial penalties on wrongdoers.67 On the basis of the above-stated concerns, the 
derivative action regime was introduced as a mechanism complementary to other structural as well as 
internal and external corporate governance devices, to better enforce directors’ duties, ensure that 
directors pay attention to their legal duties,68 and to achieve fairness in corporate governance between 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. As described by Huang, the adoption of this 
mechanism was “a major development in Chinese company legislation” which was expected to have “far-
reaching implications for corporate governance” in China.69 These implications might be said to include 
additional enhancement of minority shareholder protection, the provision of effective means against 
wrongdoing managing officers and directors of companies, who may be predominantly majority 
shareholders especially in SOEs, 70  and the resolution of power imbalances between directors and 
shareholders and between minority and majority shareholders, to name but a few. 
 
3. Shareholding Percentage Requirement 
 
After discussing the significance of a well-designed eligibility threshold, this section goes on to examine a 
few doctrinal deficiencies in terms of shareholders’ eligibility to bring a derivative action in the CCL, with 
a particular focus on the shareholding percentage requirement in JSLCs.  
 
3.1 Rational and Legislative Experiences for Imposing a Percentage 
Requirement 
Shareholding percentage is not required as one of the elements qualifying shareholders to bring a 
derivative action in public companies in common law countries.71 This is probably because of the case 
law-based tradition of common law countries, which allows more flexibility in law-making and judicial 
control, to avoid abuse of the derivative action mechanism. For instance, in the UK Companies Act 2006, 
                                                                                                                                       
Limpaphayom and T. Lu, ‘Does Corporate Governance Matter in China’ (2008) 19 China Economic Review 460; H. Sami, J. Wang 
and H. Zhou, ‘Corporate Governance and Operating Performance of Chinese Listed Firms’ (2011) 20 Journal of International 
Accounting, Auditing and Taxation 106; L. Miles and Z. Zhang, ‘Improving Corporate Governance in State-Owned Corporations in 
China: Which Way Forward?’ (2006) 6 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 213; S. Li, ‘China’s (Painful) Transition from Relation-based 
to Rule-based Governance: When and How, not If and Why’ (2013) 21 Corporate Governance: An International Review 567; G. Xu, T. 
Zhou, B. Zeng and J. Shi, ‘Directors’ Duties in China’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 57. 
67 R. Kraakman, H. Park & S. Shavell, ‘When are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interest?’ (1993) Discussion Paper No. 133 
Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138.  
68 A. Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (Oxford University Press 2007) 45, 52; see also A. 
Keay, ‘The Ultimate Objective of the Company and the Enforcement of the Entity Maximisation and Sustainability Model’ (2010) 
10 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 35 at 40–45; J. Zhao, ‘A More Efficient Derivative Action System in China: Challenges and 
Opportunities through Corporate Governance Theory’ (2013) 64 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 233. 
69 H. Huang, ‘The Statutory Derivative Action in China: Critical Analysis and Recommendations for Reform’ (2007) 4 Berkeley 
Business Law Journal 227 at 242. 
70 See J. V. Feinerman, ‘New Hope for Corporate Governance in China?’ (2007) 191 China Quarterly 590 at 605. 
71 For the UK law, see Section 260-263 of the Companies Act 2006. The UK makes no distinction between private and public 
companies in this regard. 
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court permission is required before a claim brought by a shareholder can even continue as a derivative 
claim, upon proving the existence of a “prima facie” case.72 In the US, taking the most influential Delaware 
corporate law practice as an example, a two-step test was established in the Supreme Court case of Zapata 
Corp v Maldonado73 in reviewing the decision of the special litigation committee: first, the court “must 
inquire into the independence and good faith of the committee and the bases supporting its conclusions”, 
and a company “should have the burden of proving independence, good faith and a reasonable 
investigation”. Judicial control in common law countries purportedly restrains potential abusive usages of 
the derivative action mechanism, whereas civil law countries with a great respect for legislation would 
normally use ex ante procedural safeguards to achieve the same purpose, shareholding percentage 
requirement being a typical example.74  
In Germany, the current law allows one or more persons holding shares constituting at least 1% of the 
company’s capital, or having a nominal value of at least 100,000 Euro, to file a derivative action in 
companies limited by shares.75 South Korean law stipulates that the shareholding threshold for filing a 
derivative suit is 0.01% in the case of listed companies.76 As for non-listed companies, any shareholder 
who holds no less than 1% of the total outstanding shares may demand that the company file an action 
against the directors to enforce their liability. 77  In Taiwan, the derivative action mechanism is only 
available to companies limited by shares, and any shareholder(s) who hold(s) 3% or more of the shares 
may request the supervisors of the company to institute an action against a director(s).78 This threshold is 
widely criticised by scholars as unnecessarily high and pragmatically prejudicial against minority 
shareholders who wish to bring a derivative action.79 Japan is one of the first countries in the civil law 
group not to have a quantitative shareholding requirement.80 Empirical research demonstrated that 119 
derivative actions were brought in listed companies in Japan during the period from 1993 to 2009, 
significantly more than the number of law suits in China.81  
                                            
72 Section 261(2) UK Companies Act 2006; see also Lesini v Westrip Holdings Ltd [2011] 1 BCLC 498; Abouraya v Signund [2014] 
EWHC 277.  
73 Zapata Corp v Maldonado 430 A. 2d 779, 788 (Delaware 1981). 
74 A. Cahn & D.C. Donald, Comparative Company Law: Text and Cases on the Law Governing Corporations in Germany, the UK and the 
USA (Cambridge: Cambridge University 2010), 602. 
75 §148(1) Aktg 1965. 
76 Korean Securities and Exchange Act 1962 (amended in 1976 and 2002) § 191-13(1). 
77 Article 403. Commercial Act (Republic of Korea) 1963.  
78 Article 214, Companies Act (Taiwan) 2009; L.Y. Liu, ‘The Derivative Action’ (2004) 64 Taiwan Law Journal 156. 
79 W.R. Tseng and W.W.Y. Wang, ‘Derivative Actions in Taiwan: Legal and Cultural Hurdles with A Glimmer of Hope for the 
Future, in D. Puchniak, H. Baum and M. Ewing-Chow (eds), The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2012) 215; L.Y. Liu, ‘The Derivative Action’ (2004) 64 Taiwan Law Journal 156; H. Wang, 
‘The Derivative Action in Taiwan Company Law and Reform Suggestions 公司法中的代表诉讼缺失与改进之道 ’ in 
Commercial Monographs – Professor Lai Fiftieth Birthday Congratulations Proceedings 商法专论- 赖英映照教授五十岁生日祝贺论文集 
(Taipei: Yuanzhao Publishing 1995) 130.   
80 Section 847 (1), (2) of Companies Act (Japan) 2005 replaced Section 267 (1) with the old Japanese Commercial Code. Both 
sections allow any shareholder who held at least one share continuously for six months to demand that a corporation act to 
enforce a directors’ duties; M.M Siems, ‘Private Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: Derivative Action as a Global Phenomenon’ 
in S. Wrbka, S. Van Uytsel and M. Siems, Collective Actions: Enhancing Access to Justice and Reconciling Multilayer Interests? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University 2012) 93. 
81 M. Nakahigashi & D.W. Punchniak, ‘Land of the Rising Derivative Action: Revisiting Irrationality to Understand Japan’s 
Unreluctant Shareholder Litigate’ in D.W. Puchniak, H. Baum and M. Ewing-Chow (eds), The Derivative Action in Asia: A 
Comparative and Functional Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2012) p.128 at 172–173. Other than the absence of a 
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3.2 Identifying the Differences in Application of Derivative Action between 
LLCs and JSLCs  
In light of the requirements, reforms and criticisms in other jurisdictions, the 1% shareholding threshold 
requirements enshrined in Article 151 of the CCL 2013 seemingly constitute a barrier hindering the vast 
majority of shareholders, including individual and institutional shareholders, in JSLCs who wish to bring 
derivative actions as an effective remedy, proved by the drastic differences between derivative action 
cases in LLCs and JSLCs. We used the most authoritative legal search engine in China, Bei Da Fa Bao, and 
found that since the implementation of the CCL 2005, 126 cases have been accepted by the People’s 
Court in which shareholder(s) brought derivative actions either individually or collectively.82  The number 
of derivative action cases in LLCs in China is notably higher, or at least not considerably lower, than the 
number of derivative action cases in other jurisdictions.83 In the meantime, the Sanlian Shangshe case in 
2009 was the only case involving a shareholder in a JSLC bringing a derivative action. The question arises, 
therefore, why the mechanism has been scarcely used in JSLCs in China, considering that shareholders in 
LLCs in China seek to use the mechanism much more often. 
In a logical manner, doubts have been thrown on the threshold applicable to JSLCs. For example, the 
percentage requirement prescribed in Chinese Company Law has been heavily criticised by scholars thus 
far. The following sections contribute to this matter by way of an empirical analysis, and feasible 
alternatives are suggested as a result.84  
                                                                                                                                       
shareholding requirement, this may also be due to a number of other factors, of which low and fixed litigation costs are 
important. See M.D. West, ‘Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan’ (2001) 30 Journal of Legal Studies 351; Z. Zhang, 
‘Making the Shareholder Derivative Action Happen in China: How should Lawsuits be Funded?’ (2008) 38 Hong Kong Law Journal 
523. 
82 This includes 13 cases in 2006, 6 cases in 2007, 17 cases in 2008, 22 cases in 2009, 22 cases in 2010, 14 cases in 2011, 8 cases in 
2012, 3 cases in 2013, 8 cases in 2014 and 13 cases in 2015.  
83 Based on the research of Professor Keay, since the enforcement of Section 260 of the Companies Act 2006 on 1st October 
2007, the regime of derivative action has not been used (data from a search of the Westlaw, Lexis and BAILII databases for three 
jurisdictions, namely England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland). 22 derivative actions were instituted up to September 
2015. After September 2015, there is one reported case in the period to June 2016: Brannigan v Style [2016] EWHC 512 (CH). 
Therefore, 23 derivative actions have been instituted up to June 2016. However, the popularity and effectiveness of the derivative 
action mechanism is decided by many factors. Obviously, unfair prejudice, based on Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006, has 
proved to be a very popular mechanism in minority shareholder remedies, and is argued to be a comprehensive barrier to 
instituting a derivative claim; see A. Keay, ‘Assessing Rethinking the Statutory Scheme for Derivative Action under the 
Companies Act 2006’ (2016) 16 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 39 at 41 and 59–67. In Japan, according to Nakahigashi and 
Punchniak, 29 derivative actions were brought from 1993 to 2009 for unlisted companies; M. Nakahigashi & D.W. Punchniak, 
‘Land of the Rising Derivative Action: Revisiting Irrationality to Understand Japan’s Reluctant Shareholder Litigate’ in D.W. 
Puchniak, H. Baum and M. Ewing-Chow (eds), The Derivative Action in Asia: A Comparative and Functional Approach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press (2012) p.128 at 172–173; 27 cases were bought on behalf of private companies among 31 cases from 
2000–2005 according to Ramsay and Saunders; see I.M. Ramsay and B.B. Sanders, ‘Litigation by Shareholders and Directors: An 
Empirical Study of the Statutory Derivative Action’ (2006) 6 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 397 at 420. 
84 S. Lin, Derivative Actions in Chinese Company Law (Kluwer Law International 2015); H Huang, ‘The Statutory Derivative Action in 
China: Critical Analysis and Recommendations for Reform’ (2007) 4 Berkeley Business Law Journal 227; J Deng, ‘Building an 
Investor-Friendly Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit System in China’ (2005) 46 Harvard International Law Journal 347; W. Cheng, 
‘Protection of Minority Shareholders after the New Company Law: 26 Case Studies’ (2010) International Journal of Law and 
Management 283; Z. Zhang, ‘Shareholder Derivative Action and Good Corporate Governance in China: Why the Excitement is 
Actually for Nothing’ (2011) 28 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 174; Z. Zhang, ‘Shareholder Derivative Action and Good 
Corporate Governance in China: Why the Excitement is actually for Nothing’, (2011) 28 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 174; J. 
Zhao, ‘A More Efficient Derivative Action System in China: Challenges and Opportunities through Corporate Governance 
Theory’ (2013) 64 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 233. 
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3.3 Data from the Chinese Stock Market and Practical Difficulties in Meeting 
the 1% threshold  
One should review the statistics in relation to the general scale and percentage of shareholding in China 
before commenting on whether the current 1% shareholding percentage threshold is too high for 
shareholders in JSLCs. A report issued by the China Securities Investor Protection Fund Corporation in 
2012 indicated that 52.27% of surveyed investors invested less than RMB 100,000 in stocks, and 85.2% of 
them invested less than RMB 500,000. 85  This study was continued by the Feng Hua Finance and 
Economic Consulting Firm (丰华财经) for their report in 2013, finding that 45.36% of the surveyed 
investors invested less than RMB 50,000 in stocks and 85.57% invested less than RMB 500,000.86 More 
recently, a report published by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange disclosed that 84.4% of the investors had 
invested less than RMB 500,000.87 Finally, a report from the China Securities Depository and Clearing 
Corporation Limited (CSDC) indicated that 76.73% of the surveyed investors invested less than RMB 
100,000 and 95.15% of them invested less than RMB 500,000.88 Considering the fact that most of the 
listed companies have a market value of RMB 1 billion,89 RMB 500,000 is a long way from 1% of the 
market value. Therefore, the holders of these stocks, more than 84% of the shareholders in listed 
companies based on the data from 2012–2015, do not have the right to bring a derivative action as an 
independent claimant under the current company law of China.  
Furthermore, based on the shareholding distribution of A-shares90  held by professional institutional 
shareholders in 2014, the breakdown of the shareholding percentage of seven groups of intuitional 
shareholders, including pension funds, QFIIs, insurance companies, trusts, corporate annuities, securities 
firms (proprietary accounts) and securities firms (asset management schemes) in listed companies in 
China, were 0.61%, 1.17% 1.71%, 3.87%, 1.37%, 0.14%, 0.31% and 0.23% respectively. It is reported by 
the China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited that there are 289,900 institutional 
shareholders investing in 2,839 listed companies in China. 91  On average, more than one hundred 
institutional shareholders, in various forms, are investing in an individual listed company. It is also likely 
that there will be more than one institutional shareholder investing in a company that belongs to one of 
                                            
85  A Survey of Securities Investors 2012 (2012 年 中 国 证 券 投 资 者 综 合 调 查 报 告 ) p.43, available via 
http://www.sipf.com.cn/images/NewCH/zxdc/2013/03/01/EC3861DC3E3764896A8CB1DC5F4E94C7.pdf 
86 JFINFO, A Survey of Individual Investors 2013, available at http://www.jfinfo.com/special/2013report.pdf(2014) p.11. 
87 Shenzhen Stock Exchange, A Survey of Individual Shareholders of 2015, 2015 年个人投资者状况调查报告, available via 
http://www.szse.cn/main/aboutus/bsyw/39759023.shtml.  
88 J. Coffee & D.E. Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evolution and a Proposal for Legislative Reform’ (1981) 
81 Columbia Law Review 261 at 312. 
89 China Centre for Market Value Management, ‘The A Share Annual Report of China 2012 and 2013’ (2012 年中国 A股市值
年度报告 2013年中国 A股市值年度报告). 
90 A-shares are denominated in Renminbi; comparatively, B-shares are denominated in foreign currency (US dollars in the 
Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong Kong dollars in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange). 
91  China Securities Depository and Clearing Corporation Limited (CSDC), CSDC Monthly Report, February 2016 
http://www.chinaclear.cn/zdjs/editor_file/20160314173907448.pdf p.2 
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the seven international shareholder groups mentioned above. Therefore, the likelihood is that a number 
of institutional shareholders will not qualify as a  claimant for bringing derivative action either. 
 
3.4 Empirical Observations  
The author collected a set of original data in July 2016. This involved investigating the eligibility of the 
top ten biggest shareholders from a sample of 800 listed companies in China in terms of bringing a 
derivative action.92 The samples consist of 400 listed companies on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange and 
400 on the Shanghai Stock Exchange. This empirical research was carried out using purposive sampling, 
with controls placed on the types of companies chosen for the survey in terms of nature and size, and we 
specifically looked for representative samples to make sure the sample is correctly balanced. We identified 
the key index factors for JSLCs in terms of their key characteristics. As detailed below, we selected these 
samples on the basis of various criteria: was it a SOE or not; the number of shareholders; total 
capitalisation; and industrial classification. The aim was to deliver a set of legitimate and comprehensive 
data that genuinely reflects the pattern of listed companies in China, and lay a solid base for research on 
the shareholding percentage of the top ten shareholders.93 The top ten shareholders were selected because 
the publicly available data on shareholding percentage was limited to this information.   
The sample of 800 selected companies was composed of 396 listed SOEs and 404 listed non-SOEs (see 
Figure 1), aiming to deliver a balanced view of the unique shareholding structure of SOEs in China and 
its implications for derivative action. As JSLCs in China consist of SOEs and non-SOEs, the selection of 
data is important for our research on the importance of derivative actions in both SOEs and non-SOEs 
in China, and the distinct position of non-SOEs in the corporate governance transformation to a more 
economic and market-oriented model. Figure 1 aims to show a clear and balanced view of the unique 
shareholding structure of SOEs in China and its implications for derivative action. The figure works well 
with Figures 2 to 5 to demonstrate that the sample selection method is convincing and coherent. 
                                            
92 The data was collected from 15–22 June 2016 and reflected the shareholding structures of sample companies as of these dates. 
93 This sample-selection methodology is preferred instead of investigating all listed companies as: (1) the massive number of listed 
companies adds to the pragmatic difficulty of a thorough investigation; (2) the shareholding structure, the number of 
shareholders and the number of listed companies constantly change with time; (3) a random selection of samples would not 
reflect the industry attributes of listed companies and might lead to biased results on shareholding structures that are heavily 
influenced by the industries the companies engage in.  
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Second, the sample involves companies which are representative of the target companies, namely JSLCs, 
in terms of the number of shareholders and total share capital. In other words, the distribution of the 
number of the companies based on different industrial classifications should match those of the entire 
target population. These two aspects are investigated in order to ensure that the poll represents a balanced 
and representative sample. As for the former, the distribution of the number of shareholders in the 
sample of 800 listed companies collected by the authors, as demonstrated in Figure 2, is consistent with 
the distribution of all listed companies in terms of shareholder numbers, based on data collected by 
EastMoney (东方财富) on 30th June 201694 regarding the number of shareholders in listed companies in 
China. As for the latter, the pattern of the total share capital collected and organised by the authors, 
demonstrated in Figure 3, is also consistent with the pattern based on the data for the total capitalisation 
of listed companies collected and produced by Hexun Data (和讯数据).95 
                                            
94 Obviously, the authors are aware there are limitations to this matching exercise since there is a small timescale gap here. 
Available via http://data.eastmoney.com/cmjzd/ (assessed 11 August 2016). 
95 Available via http://datainfo.stock.hexun.com/ssgs/jbsj/gbfb.aspx (assessed 11 August 2016). 
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Third, these samples, including both SOEs and non-SOEs, cover all industries with listed companies, 
including manufacturing, information technology and software, construction, scientific research and 
technical services, wholesale and retailing, transport warehousing and postal industries, mining, the 
financial industry, education, electricity, heat, gas and water protection and supply, and water conservation, 
20 
 
environmental and public facilities management (Figures 4 and 5). The percentages of the sample 
companies in each industry are roughly consistent with the pattern of industry classification published by 
the National Equities Exchange and Quotations listed companies in the CSRC annual report.96 We aimed 
to select a sample of 800 companies from all relevant types of industries to enhance the 
representativeness of our sample of all listed companies in a fair manner. 
Figure 4 Industrial classifications of non-SOEs 
 
 
                                            
96 CSRC, 2014 Annual Report p.13. 
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Figure 5 Industrial classifications of SOEs 
 
The hypothesis was that if the current shareholding threshold prescribed in CCL does not hinder the use 
of the derivative action mechanism by minority shareholders in listed companies, which we assume have a 
dispersed ownership structure, the top ten shareholders, or at least the majority of them, should be not 
barred by the shareholding threshold from bringing derivative actions due to their shareholding 
percentage.97 A few questions were raised in order to investigate the soundness of the hypothesis, as well 
as the possibility of law reform: how many shareholders among the top ten are entitled to bring derivative 
action, if they were to bring a lawsuit on their own? What is the average percentage shareholding? What if 
the percentage requirement were to be lowered to 0.5%? And what if the percentage requirement was 
lowered to 0.1%? 
The result of this quantitative research informs us that on average (as demonstrated in Figure 6), 52.10% 
of the shareholders could bring a derivative action if the standing requirement was 1%, 75.44% if the 
standing requirement was 0.5%, and 99.44% if the standing requirement was 0.1%.98 Drawing from this 
empirical study, it is logical to propose a lower shareholding percentage requirement for listed companies, 
to enable more minority shareholders to use the derivative action regime to protect their interests. More 
                                            
97 Data on the top ten shareholders’ shareholding percentage is on file and available on request. 
98 Data available on request. 
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user-friendly eligibility criteria could significantly improve the enforcement of company law, and thus 
contribute to good corporate governance.99 
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Figure 6: The percentage of top ten shareholders’ eligibility to bring a 
derivative action and different standing recruitment in Company Law 
Percentage of Top Ten Shareholders who are eligible to bring a derivative action in 800 listed companies sample
 
 
3.5 Difficulties in Collective Action 
Some might argue that it is possible for two or more shareholders to bring a derivative action in a 
collective manner, since the law does allow “shareholders that hold an aggregate 1% or more” to bring 
such derivative actions. 100  However, it is not practically feasible to call for collective action among 
shareholders in JSLCs, especially listed ones, at least in China, where most minority shareholders are 
individual shareholders.101 Organising a number of individual shareholders who are willing to bring a 
collective derivative action can be a very difficult process. In principle, individual shareholders of listed 
companies who propose to commence or intervene in a lawsuit may consult the central securities registry 
and the clearance agency to obtain details of other shareholders who may want to bring this litigation 
jointly. However, in practice it is very hard for them to acquire contact information because of privacy 
considerations. As a result, these shareholders almost invariably rely on the “last resort” of soliciting other 
shareholders publicly, which will damage the confidence of public investors in the company and could 
                                            
99 J.V. Feinerman, ‘New Hope for Corporate Governance in China?’ (2007) 191 The China Quarterly 590 at 600–601. 
100 Article 151 CCL 2013. 
101 F.X. Hong & S.H. Goo, ‘Derivative Action in China: Problems and Prospectus’ [2009] Journal of Business Law 376 at 388.  
23 
 
affect the reputation of the company.102 Information asymmetry has proved in practice to be a major 
obstacle for joint derivative action claimants, who need to acquire sufficient information about their 
follow shareholders. Therefore, it is clear that joint litigation is either impractical or harmful (or at least 
very difficult), which is against the purpose of the derivative action mechanism to protect the interests of 
the company. 
 
3.6 Proposals for Changes and Difficulties in Transplanting Common Law 
Principles: UK Law as an Example 
In light of the above-stated difficulties, Zhu and Chen proposed a legislative change, intending to replace 
the current shareholding percentage threshold with a share sum requirement with a focus on the value of 
the shares.103 Presumably, the value of the shares here refers to market value rather than nominal value, 
an arbitrary figure bearing no relevance to the business reality. However, the fact that the market value of 
the shares floats with the market is likely to bring a lot of uncertainties and difficulties in enforcement, 
should this proposal be adopted. No alternative suggestion has yet been offered to address this potentially 
serious matter.  
From a practical point of view, it is noted by Zhang, for instance, that a 1% shareholding is a “substantial 
figure” in listed companies, and in China this figure is reached mostly by big block-holders,104 many of 
whom are SOEs or other government-controlled entities which were brought into corporate shareholding 
structures during the period of restructuring traditional SOEs for listing, and are in a strong rather than 
vulnerable position in comparison to directors, who are often appointed by government entities.105 In 
order to address the concern that the shareholding percentage requirement may be a hurdle for 
shareholders in JSLCs, some scholars have suggested that China follow the common law route and 
abolish the shareholding percentage requirement, claiming that any fixed minimum percentage or 
monetary value of shareholding is arbitrary, as the quantity of ownership does not reflect the potential 
ability of minority shareholders to make valid and legitimate decisions and judgements.106 
Derivative action in most common law jurisdictions is provided for in codified statutes. The courts’ 
decisions to grant applications are always decisions made according to statutory criteria. Criteria need to 
                                            
102 J. Liu, ‘Experience of Internationalization of Chinese Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: How to Make the Hybrid of 
Civil Law and Common Law Work?’ (2015) European Business Law Review 107 at 119; this also happens in cases in which 
shareholders try to protect themselves through direct litigation; see for example Yinguansha Shareholders Claims December (银广夏
小股东维权) 2011; and more recently MingYao Investment v FAW Automotive  (明曜投资董事长曾昭股东维权抗两家一汽系) 
2016. 
103 H.C. Zhu & G.Q. Chen, ‘China Introduces Statutory Derivative Action’ (1st July 2005) International Financial Law Review 
available at http://www.iflr.com/Article/1984802/China-introduces-statutory-derivative-action.html  
104 Z. Zhang, ‘The Shareholder Derivative Action and Good Corporate Governance in China: Why the Excitement is Actually 
for Nothing’ (2011) 28 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 174 at 194.  
105 Z. Zhang, ‘The Shareholder Derivative Action and Good Corporate Governance in China: Why the Excitement is Actually 
for Nothing’ (2011) 28 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 174 at 194. 
106 The “rationale underpinning the minimum shareholding strategy is flawed”, Z. Zhang, ‘The Shareholder Derivative Action 
and Good Corporate Governance in China: Why the Excitement is actually for Nothing’ (2011) 28 UCLA Pacific Basin Law 
Journal 174 at 197. 
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be met before the court can authorise the initiation of a derivative action. Taking the UK as an example, 
derivative claims were delivered at common law for years until a statutory derivative proceedings scheme 
was introduced in the Companies Act 2006, following the approach extant in many Commonwealth 
countries 107  in order to promote simplification and modernisation of the law to improve its 
accessibility.108 Keay argued that the primary characteristic of statutory shareholder derivative action is 
that the “courts are required to perform a gatekeeper role in order to exclude frivolous or unmeritorious 
cases”.109 Permission can be only granted if the shareholders who propose to bring a derivative action 
pass two stages successfully. These two stages are designed to enable the court to make decisions in an 
efficient manner about whether to give permission to proceed with the action in absence of involvement 
from the company. 110  First, they have to establish a prima facie case on merit. 111  This stage of the 
permission process is designed to assess whether the company and the respondent should be put to the 
expense and inconvenience of considering and contesting the application for permission.112 The court will 
therefore filter out cases that stand little or no chance of success and dismiss frivolous claim without 
company involvement at the earliest possible opportunity.113 
If this stage proves successful, the case may proceed towards a second stage.114 Here, the court must 
decide whether to grant permission by taking into account three criteria listed in section 263(2), including, 
for example, whether “a person acting in accordance with Section 172 (duty to promote the success of 
the company) would not seek to continue the claim”.115 Although no discretion should be given to the 
courts at this point, the court subsequently has discretion to decide whether to allow the claim to proceed 
if none of the criteria in section 263(2) apply. In the process of exercising this discretion, the court must 
take into account factors that are embedded in section 263(3) and (4).116  
The court as the “gate keeper” and the discretion vested in the court regarding whether or not to proceed 
are seen as central issues under the new statutory procedures. However, we do have reservations in 
adopting this two-staged threshold in China, based on the following four reasons. First, commentators do 
not completely agree about the effectiveness of this approach. The criterion that the applicant has to act 
                                            
107 Such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Singapore. 
108 Law Commission, ‘Shareholder Remedies: Report on a Reference under section 3(1)(e) of the Law Commissions Act 1965’ 
(1997) 7 & para 6.4. 
109 A. Keay, ‘Assessing Rethinking the Statutory Scheme for Derivative Action under the Companies Act 2006’ (2016) 16 Journal 
of Corporate Law Studies 39 at 40.  
110 These first two have been merged by the courts in some cases, such as Bridge v Daley [2015] EWHC 2121 (Ch); Stimpson v 
Southern Private Landlords Association [2009] EWHC 2072.  
111 See section 261(2) Companies Act 2006; see also Iesini and Others v Westrip Holdings Ltd and Others [2009] EWHC 2526 (Ch), 
[2011] 1 BCLC 498, [2010] BCC 420. 
112 Langley Ward Ltd v Trevor [2011] EWHC 1893 (Ch), [62].   
113 HL Deb 9 May 2006, vol 681, col 883 (Lord Goldsmith). 
114 See A. Keay and J. Loughrey, ‘Derivative Proceedings in a Brave New World for Company Management and Shareholders’ 
[2010] Journal of Business Law 151. 
115 Section 261(2) Companies Act 2006 
116 Davies and Worthington, however, think this is a third stage, where a number of factors are laid down which the court must 
take into account in deciding whether to give permission, such as whether the shareholder seeking to bring the claim is acting in 
good faith, possibilities of ratification, and the likelihood of company pursuing the claim. See Section 263 (3) and Section 268 (2) 
Companies Act 2006; P.L. Davies & S. Worthington, Gower Principles of Modern Company Law (10th ed, Sweet Maxwell 2016) 601–
602. 
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in good faith in bringing a derivative claim,117 for example, is criticised as “uncertain and unworkable”.118 
It is argued that the court needs to decide whether the benefit from a proposed litigation would be 
outweighed by the harm that it would potentially cause to the company, without full evidence verified by 
cross-examination.119  The transplant should therefore be subject to more rigorous assessment of its 
fitness with comprehensive consideration of other path dependence factors, including a number of issues 
such as overburdened court systems, limited judicial resources, judges’ skills and knowledge,120 the limited 
knowledge of shareholders as natural persons, and information asymmetries between minority 
shareholders and institutional shareholders.121 As a matter of fact, only 56% of Chinese judges hold 
degrees,122 and many civil servants who are described as judges and work in administrative roles.123  
Second, the prima facie test has been made familiar by lawyers in the UK and some other common law 
countries, and was seen as the primary test in applications for interim injunctions in most cases during the 
twentieth century.124 However, the test is not widely known and applied in China in relation to company 
law.  
Third, the codified restatement of directors’ duties, which reflect common law and equitable principles, is 
key for the understanding and enforcement of directive action in the UK and other common law 
countries.125 It is indeed the fact that the concept of fiduciary duties, including the duty of loyalty and the 
duty of care, are explicitly stipulated in Chinese company law, 126  with codification of a number of 
misconducts in terms of the violation of duties by directors.127 However, the successful application and 
enforcement of the approach is heavily dependent on judicial discretion about when this inclusive and 
flexible principle may be applied to individual cases, so the nature and scope of the duty may be 
constantly refined and enriched by precedential ruling by judges. 128  This makes it problematic to 
transplant this common law approach to jurisdictions with a civil law background, with difficulties in 
                                            
117 See Stimpson v Southern Landlords Association [2009] EWHC 2072; [2010] BCC 387; Section 263 (3) a Companies Act 2006. 
118 A. Reisberg, ‘Theoretical Reflections on Derivative Action in English Law: The Representative Problem’ (2006) 3 European 
Company and Financial law Review 69 at 101 and 103.  
119 Contribution of Zhang Zhong quoted in J. Loughrey, ‘Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Litigation: The Practical Perspective’ 
in J. Loughrey (ed), Directors’ Duties and Shareholder Ligation in the Wake of the Financial Crisis (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 2013) 229 
at 245.  
120 See T. Gong, ‘Dependent Judiciary and Unaccountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in Contemporary China’ (2004) 4 China 
Review 33; W. Gu, ‘The Judiciary in Economic and Political Transformation: Quo Vadis Chinese Courts?’ (2013) 1 The Chinese 
Journal of Comparative Law 303. 
121  It is worth pointing out that among the 126 reported cases found through Bei Da Fa Bao, most are still brought by 
shareholders as natural persons, with only 19 cases involving company/institutional shareholders as claimants bringing derivative 
actions (“representative action” was the term used in the judgments) as listed in footnote 144 
122 Jingwen Zhu (ed), China Legal Development Report 中国法律发展报告：数据库和指标体系 (Beijing: Renmin University Press 
2007) 34. 
123 The Economist, Legal Reform Judging Judges (Sep 24th 2015). 
124 See Hoffman-La Roche (F) & Co v Secretary of State for Trade & Industry [1975] AC 295 at 338 and 380; see also C. Gray, 
‘Interlocutory Injunctions since Cyanamid’ (1981) 40 Cambridge Law Journal 307; P. Carlson, ‘Granting an Interlocutory Injunction: 
What is the Test’ (1982-1983) 12 Manitoba Law Journal 109. 
125 S. Watkins, ‘The Common Law Derivative Acton: An Outmoded Relic’ (1999) 30 Cambrian Law Review 40; J.L. Yap, ‘Whither 
the Common Law Derivative Action’ (2009) 38 Common Law World Review 197. 
126 Article 147 CCL 2013. 
127 Article 148 CCL 2013. 
128 G. Xu, T. Zhou, B. Zeng & J. Shi, ‘Directors’ Duties in China’ (2013) 14 European Business Organization Law Review 57 at 87. 
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making the principle a workable one in judicial practice.129 This is demonstrated by the empirical research 
of Xu et al. and historical evidence from Japanese transplantation.130  
Fourth, the use of derivative action in the UK also depends on its relationship with the remedy of unfair 
prejudice, embedded in Section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 without court authorisation. The notion 
of “unfair prejudice” does not have an equivalent in Chinese company law in terms of shareholder rights 
in bringing a lawsuit.131  
The imposition of a fixed and lowered threshold figure for listed companies seems necessary at least at 
the current time in China, for its effect in avoiding excessive litigations or malicious lawsuits. Given that 
the above-discussed empirical study results indicate that a modification from a 1% threshold to a 0.1% 
threshold would render roughly 99% of the top ten shareholders in listed companies (ranked in terms of 
their shareholding percentage) eligible to bring derivative actions, the authors suggest lowering the current 
shareholding requirement to at least 0.1% of the total shareholding of the company, to enable an 
adequate number of minority shareholders in listed companies to use the mechanism to protect their 
interests, to use their collective powers in the company’s best interests, and most importantly, to mitigate 
the potential risk of frivolous lawsuits. 
 
3.7 0.1% Proposal and the Balance between Voices and Exits  
 
Another legitimate question that needs addressing is whether a shareholder who owns 0.1% of the 
company share in a JSLC would have incentive to sue in the interests of the company in his own name. It 
is crucial to point out that even under the proposed new threshold of 0.1% of shareholding, those 
shareholders who are eligiblein JSLCs are not small shareholders or minority shareholders. Based on our 
empirical data, 7.65% of the top ten shareholders fall within the shareholding percentage range of 0.1% to 
0.2%. As we mentioned earlier, the CSDC concluded that 76.73% of the surveyed investors had invested 
less than RMB 100,000. It would be difficult to imagine that these shareholders would have incentives to 
bring a derivative action. However, considering the 91 million gu min (data from July 2015), it is highly 
unlikely that these shareholders would fall in the category suggested by us based on a threshold 
shareholding percentage of 0.1%. Moreover, regarding individual shareholders, only a small portion of 
shares in listed companies are held by them, with average ownership equalling 2.38% for all individual 
shareholders, and it is very unlikely that they will hold 0.1% of the shares in any company. 132 We are 
                                            
129 Ibid.   
130 The loyalty duty has not been applied separate by Japanese courts; see H. Kanda and C.J. Milhaupt, ‘Re-examining Legal 
Transplants: The Director’s Fiduciary Duty in Japanese Corporate Law’ (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 887. 
131 M.M Siems, ‘Private Enforcement of Directors’ Duties: Derivative Action as a Global Phenomenon’ in S. Wrbka, S. Van 
Uytsel & M. Siems, Collective Actions: Enhancing Access to Justice and Reconciling Multilayer Interests? (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
2012) 93 at 101. 
132 OECD, OECD Survey of Corporate Governance Frameworks in Asia 2017, p.5. 
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convinced that shareholders(s) who own(s) 0.1% have sufficient self-interests in the outcome of litigation 
to conduct a truly adversarial lawsuit.  
Furthermore, it is important to clarify the rationale for giving adequate standing to members while 
dissatisfied shareholders in a listed company could use the ‘exit strategy’ by leaving the company. It is 
clear that derivative actions may entail possible benefits in two ways. First, Reisberg summarised two 
main purposes of derivative action, including deterrence of mismanagement and compensating the 
company and its shareholders for harm caused.133 The recovery involved ex post liability and it may only 
be made after the derivative action is brought. Therefore, despite the fact the shareholders could choose 
to sell their shares, the damage has taken place and the interests of the company and the shareholders 
have been harmed, and they are entitled to the financial benefit of compensation. Lin argued that the 
selling of shares in this scenario does not mean that they are not affected by the alleged wrongdoing, since 
the value of shares may have been affected by this wrongdoing and thus the value of the shares, as the 
property of the shareholders, has reduced.134 Selling the shares, in this sense, would lead to immediate loss 
without having their voice heard for remedy and compensation.  
Second, while the “shareholder engagement”, “long-term economic interests” and “long-term investment 
culture” have been emphasised post-financial crisis 2008,135 it may not always be rational to use an “exit 
strategy” as an option. Despite the fact that it is difficult to find an optional mix of exit and voice, 
Hirschman famously argued that “exit” and “voice” work best together, and voice plays a crucial role in 
understanding how organisations actually work.136 This may also apply to shareholders when they are 
faced with the option of getting their voice heard by bringing derivative actions when they perceive that 
firms are demonstrating a decrease in quality, or such actions would benefit the company (and their 
members).  
3.8 Accessibility and Incentives for Institutional Investors to Bring Derivative Actions  
 
Existing research has supported the argument that altering the shareholding threshold will likely improve 
the accessibility of the derivative action mechanism for shareholders, which is the major legislative aim of 
Chinese law drafters.137  Therefore, a proposal for a lower threshold in relation to the shareholding 
percentage and period will be made to make derivative action in China more effective, and to ensure that 
the regime is utilised more systematically in JSLCs instead of being mere window-dressing. Moreover, 
                                            
133 A. Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (Oxford University Press 2007) 51. 
134 S. Lin, ‘A New Perspective on China’s Derivative Actions: Who is best Suited to Assessing Derivative Actions?’ (2016) 27 
International Company and Commercial Law Review 1 at 3. 
135 See, for example, Financial Reporting Council, The UK Stewardship Code, and September 2012; Association of British 
Insurers, ‘Improving Corporate Governance and Shareholder Engagement’; The Investment Association, Supporting UK 
Productivity with Long-Term Investment: The Investment Association’s Productivity Action Plan, March 2016; New York Stock 
Exchange Commission on Corporate Governance 2010.  
136 A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organization and State (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press 1970); see also J. Fox, ‘Exit, Voice, and Albert O. Hirschman’ (December 12, 2012) Harvard Business Review. 
137 H. Huang, ‘Shareholder Derivative Litigation in China: Empirical Findings and Comparative Analysis’ (2012) 27 Banking and 
Finance Law Review 619; S. Lin, Derivative Actions in Chinese Company Law (Kluwer Law International 2015). 
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since China has chosen to adopt a statutory derivative action mechanism in current legislation, it is 
necessary for the mechanism to be user-friendly for shareholders who are genuinely willing to initiate law 
suits on behalf of companies. It is particularly relevant for institutional shareholders in China with strong 
motivation to engage in corporate governance.138  
Compared with countries with mature financial markets, it may seem worrying that institutional 
shareholders in China have demonstrated a less active level of involvement in corporate governance139 to 
promote private enforcement. It is undeniable that there are means other than derivative action for 
institutional shareholders to monitor and evaluate directors’ performance, ranging from the threat of 
diverting their shares, to the active use of their voting power in board elections and proxy contest.140 They 
are becoming increasingly active in governing their portfolio companies;141 this is particularly the case for 
securities investment funds. In particular, the existing literature seems to suggest that in general they 
prefer behind-the-scenes private engagements such as voting;142 presenting proposals at shareholders’ 
meetings and ongoing dialogues in public, activist engagements and courtroom confrontations are 
regarded as the very last resort. 143  Our empirical research specifically identified some characters of 
institutional investors’ derivative action. As discussed above, since the implementation of the CCL 2005, 
126 cases have been accepted by the People’s Court when shareholder(s) brought derivative actions either 
individually or collectively. Among these derivative action cases we identified, there were nineteen in 
which institutional shareholders acted as claimants.144  We further found that only five out of these 
nineteen cases were allowed (including those that were fully or partly accepted), while the rest were 
                                            
138 See F. Jiang & K.A. Kim, ‘Corporate Governance in China: A Modern Perspective’ (2015) 32 Journal of Corporate Finance 190; B. 
Gong, Understanding Institutional Shareholder Activism: A Comparative Study of the UK and China (Routledge 2014); Z. Chen, 
B. Ke & Z. Yang, ‘Minority Shareholders' Control Rights and the Quality of Corporate Decisions in Weak Investor Protection 
Countries: A Natural Experiment from China’ (2013) 88 The Accounting Review 1211. 
139 B. Gong, ‘The Limits of Institutional Shareholder Activism in China and the United Kingdom: Some Comparisons’ in R. 
Tomasic (Ed.) Routledge Handbook of Corporate Law (London: Routledge 2017). 
140  W. Wu, S. A. Johan and O. M. Rui, ‘Institutional Investors, Political Connections, and the Incidence of Regulatory 
Enforcement Against Corporate Fraud’ (2016) 134 Journal of Business Ethics 709 at 712.  
141 C. Xi, ‘Institutional Shareholder Activism in China: Law and Practice (Part 1)’ (2006) 17 International Company and Commercial 
Law Review 251 at 251. 
142 Y. Zeng, Q. Yuan & J. Zhang, ‘Dark Side of Institutional Shareholder Activism in Emerging Markets: Evidence from China’s 
Split Share Structure Reform’ (2011) 40 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies 240 at 259. 
143 C. Xi, ‘Institutional Shareholder Activism in China: Law and Practice (Part 1)’ (2006) 17 International Company and Commercial 
Law Review 251 at 253; see also S. Estrin, & M. Prevezer, ‘The Role of Informal Institutions in Corporate Governance: Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China Compared’ (2011) 28 Asia Pacific Journal of Management 41. 
144  We identified inieteen cases involving company/institutional shareholders as claimants bringing derivative actions 
(“representative action” was the term used in the judgments). These include: Zhoushan City Civil Aviation Development Co., Ltd. v. 
Wang Yaqing (2010 ZhouPuShan No.385); Hunan Xianchu Interactive Media Company Ltd. v. Hu Jia (2013 Chao MinChuZi 
No.02014); Pingdingshan blasting equipment franchise Co. v Mao Zhenzhong (2013 Zhan MinYiChuZi No.212); Shandong Kangyuan 
Biological Breeding Ltd. v. Pan Gang (2014 HuiShangChuZi No. 234); Shaanxi Institute of Experimental Medicine Pharmaceutical v Li (2013 
XianqinMinChuZi No.03451); Pinghai Development Co., Ltd. v. Shanghai Star Group Zhen City Real Estate Co., Ltd. (2005 
HuGaoMingsiShangChuZi 1 (this case was concluded on 30th September 2007 and Company Law 2006 was applied); Ningbo 
YinzhouXin’an Printing Co., Ltd. v. WeiDong Lu (Su ZhongShangWaiChuZi No.0021); UNISON Electro Dynamics (FAAF) LLC v B 
Co., Ltd (2011 Hu YiZhongMinSiShangChuZi No.S59); Yiwu Harvest Investment Advisory Co., Ltd. v Zhejiang NiuTouNgau Tau Style 
Ltd. (2012 ZheJinShangChuZi No. 32); World Leader Development Co. Ltd v Zhongcheng Lin (2013 QuanMinChuZi No.939); Nantong 
Hengxiang Co. Ltd v XiangshuiHengxiang Co Ltd (2014 Su ShangZhongZi No. 0012); Siyang County TaHui Textile Co., Ltd. v. Jianfen 
Yu (2013 Su ShangChuZi No. 0140); Pumuyuan Co., Ltd. v. Shanghai Fusheng Bean Products Co., Ltd. et al. (2014 MinTiZi 170); 
Chongqing Li Hao Development Co., Ltd. v Jun Guo (2011 Yu WuZhongFaMinZhongZi No. 3948); Beijing YiJinYuHuiTechnony 
Investment Ltd v Shen Wang (2012 YiZhong Min ZhongZi 1751); Xinjiang WujiaquXinbao Agricultural Science and Technology Development 
Co., Ltd. v. HeJing County Hope Investment (Group) Co., Ltd. (2015 Xin MinErZhongZi No.29); Nantong East River Real Estate 
Development Co. v Yangzhou TongJi Real Estate Development Co. (2014 Su ShangZhongZi 00491); and Shanghai Huayuan Health Venture 
Capital Co., Ltd. v ShengQiu Cheng (2014 Hu ErZhongMinSiShangZhongZi S543). 
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rejected due to reasons such as shareholders failing to make a request to the supervisor first (Hunan 
Xianchu, Nantong Hengxiang, UNISON, Pumuyuan), alleging both direct action and derivative action in one 
case (Chongqing Li Hao), claimants with conflicts of interests (Yiwu Harvest, Pumuyuan and UNISON), 
directors acting within the authorisation specified by the articles of association (Yiwu Harvest; Siyang), 
directors fulfilling their duty of care (Siyang), or failing  to prove damages (Pinghai, Nantong East River). The 
status of derivative actions in China litigated by institutional shareholders is dominated the in the 
following figure 7. 
Figure 7 Status of Institutional Investors' Derivative 
Action
Non-institutional investors'
litigations
Institutional investors'
litigations that have been
allowed
Institutional investors'
litigations that have been
rejected
 
 
Looking at the causes of these nineteen actions, they include matters such as appropriating the company’s 
funds (Hunan Xianchu, Nantong Hengxiang, Nantong East River, Beijing YiJin, UNISON), taking loans from 
the company (Xinjiang WujiaquXinbao, Shanxi Pharmaceutical), exclusion from management (UNISON, 
Nantong Hengxiang), taking over the company stamp or financial accounts (Chongqing Li Hao, Nantong 
Hengxiang, Shanghai Huayuan), failing to pay capital contributions (Pinghai, Pumuyuan), failing to fulfil 
obligations under the shareholders’ agreement (Zhoushan Aviation), undervalued transfers (Siyang) and 
unfair competition (Beijing YiJin). It is worth highlighting that most actions (with three exceptions) aimed 
to settle a deadlock between two shareholders or two “camps” of shareholders, and the actions were 
usually brought by minority shareholders against majority shareholders or directors appointed by majority 
shareholders.145  
                                            
145 One case was filed by the majority against a minority shareholder, where the majority was a foreign investor excluded from the 
management (UNISON); one case was filed by the majority shareholder against the director (Siyang); and the other case was filed 
by the supervisory board against the directors who allegedly have competed with the company and diverted the company’s funds 
(Beijing YiJin). 
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It may also be observed that the derivative action mechanism has not been widely used for institutional 
shareholders to bring lawsuits against directors, supervisors or senior officers. The cases have all 
happened in LLCs where no shareholding period and percentage threshold is required.  
The lack of cases and incentives for institutional shareholders to initiate derivative proceedings may be 
the result of various intuitional, legal and reputational constraints. For instance, constraints may rest on 
traditional Chinese culture, which did not encourage litigations, since the strongly and deeply rooted 
system of conventional Confucian ethics declared that “the most important thing was to avoid litigation” 
for the cultivation of personal virtue in promoting good and humane governance.146 The reluctance of 
institutional shareholders to intervene may also be partly attributable to the regulatory threshold, with 
shareholding percentages and periods required for eligibility to bring derivative actions, as well as other 
legal constraints. Another important issue relates to the incentives for initiating such actions and the 
potential reputation costs related to this litigation. In the following section, we will address why derivative 
action should be further developed and encouraged on Chinese soil despite the existence of these 
constraints.  
The first institutional constraint may rest on the belief that cultural values deeply affect the choices of 
dispute resolution means in Chinese society. 147  The Confucian injunction to maintain long-term 
relationships between people and harmony with others may discourage litigations, with the law used as a 
vehicle for promulgating policies for the common good rather than resolving disputes among private 
parties.148 Following this philosophy may undermine the use of shareholder litigation, like other litigations, 
to avoid conflicts and maintain Confucian virtues. Instead, the mediation of disputes would be 
encouraged. 
However, contemporary arguments in the context of the economic and legal framework in China suggest 
a different trajectory. For example, the legalists believe that a nation’s cohesion can be secured by the 
application of strict legislation, together with harsh and legitimate punishment.149 Adopting strict laws has 
contributed substantially to social stability and the settlement of disputes in China.150 With the emergence 
and development of the rule of law in China as a self-sustaining principle in line with the goals for 
market-led economic growth,151  it is no longer unusual to resolve disputes through litigation in the 
current commercial and economic climate. As pointed out by Lin, there is an interaction between culture 
and derivative action, and the commercial culture promoted by Chinese recent economic development 
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indicates that shareholders, especially institutional shareholders, would not hesitate to bring an action if it 
is necessary to do so.152  
The second institutional constraint arguably rests on the inability of the underdeveloped judiciary system 
in China to accommodate the increasing volume of litigations. Issues such as overburdened court systems, 
limited judicial resources, judges’ skills and knowledge153 could all be potential worries and obstacles here. 
In fact, Chinese judges still lack experience and knowledge,154 and many civil servants are known as judges 
and work in administrative roles.155 Problems such as this lack of expertise and the absence of case law to 
help judges make decisions make derivative actions in China far from useful, compared with ordinary 
suits. These factors may discourage shareholders from bringing derivative actions.  
Whilst acknowledging the judicial difficulties, it is also worth pointing out that China has been making 
considerable strides in building a more competent and professional judiciary with the enactment of Judge 
Law and the rigorous National Bar Exam156 to gather the most talented people (rencai) for the legal 
profession.157 Many improvements have been made including diminished local protectionism, increased 
professionalism and the improved enforcement of commercial cases, due to multiple factors such as the 
increasingly diversified economy, streamlined court procedures, the improved judicial system and 
adequate funding.158  These positive aspects may encourage qualified shareholders in JSLCs to bring 
actions, giving them more confidence in the fairness of judgements and the efficiency of enforcement 
measures. If there is an increased number of derivative actions as the result of the proposed more relaxed 
“unnecessary”159 threshold in this article, it may be confidently claimed that “there are sufficient judicial 
resources to deal with this increase in shareholder litigation”, partly indicated by a healthy and 
comparatively higher ratio of one judge to every 48,000 people.160 The attitude of the Chinese courts 
towards shareholder litigation has become increasingly friendly towards shareholders since the Supreme 
People’s Court issued its Second Circular to lift the restriction on accepting cases in 2002.161  
Additionally, the guiding case system was introduced as a novel attempt to benefit from the advantages of 
both the common law and civil systems. The Supreme People’s Court of China has converted ninety-two 
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judicial opinions into what are intended to be de facto binding decisions, which local courts at all levels may 
reference when making decisions on similar cases since January 2012. 162  This will potentially bring 
benefits by enhancing faith in the judiciary in China.163  Although no cases have been converted to 
authoritative judicial opinions concerning derivative action, partly due to the shortage of cases involving 
JSLCs as the result of the high threshold and litigation fee, Chinese judges are practically accustomed to 
search similar cases reported in Bei Da Fa Bao and “China Judgements Online”164  for reference before 
making judgements, which has been helpful in terms of ensuring judicial consistency in China.  
One of the biggest legal constraints for shareholders, including institutional shareholders, in bringing 
derivative actions is the litigation fee.165 The legislative legal basis of the costs of derivative action in 
China rest on Civil Procedure Law 1992, Measures for the Administration of Attorneys’ Fee 2006. The 
usual rule is that the losing party will be ordered by the court to pay the winning party’s “case acceptance 
fee”, the fee charged by the court that tries the case, while each party pays its own attorney’s fees and 
other expenses.166 From September 2017, in order to make sure that litigation costs are tailored to a level 
that does not further discourage shareholders from bringing these actions so that the scheme can “reach 
its full potential”,167 Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues about the Application of 
the Company Law of the People’s Republic of China IV (Provision IV) were introduced to address the 
question of whether the claimant shareholder may be reimbursed for their expenses. It is stipulated that 
the courts should support the indemnity claims of shareholders who successfully bring a lawsuit on behalf 
of a company, allowing them to claim for attorneys’ fees, investigation fees, assessment fees, notary fees 
and other reasonable costs incurred during the litigation. 168  Since the “dearth of public company 
derivative suits can be mainly attributed to the restrictive standing requirement and the prohibitive 
litigation costs issues”,169 the most significant problem for derivative actions among JSLCs would be the 
shareholding percentage and period threshold if Article 26 of Provision IV can be effectively enforced in 
China. Furthermore, Huang made it clear through empirical study that the availability of “the risk agency 
fee has facilitated the bringing of securities civil suits and has led to the emergence of many 
entrepreneurial lawyers in China”.170 Referencing experience in the US,171 the increase and popularity of 
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entrepreneurial lawyers may also lead to an increase in derivative action in China with the enforcement of 
Provision IV, leaving the shareholding period and percentage as an unnecessary threshold awaiting urgent 
attention to encourage eligible shareholders to resolve disputes through this mechanism.  
The reputational constraint has also been referred to when discussing the inactivity of institutional 
investors. While private engagement approaches such as voting and resolutions normally target the 
misconduct or performance of the board of directors as a collective body, derivative actions involve a 
“personal attack on specific directors”.172 This may lead to a negative impact on the “guanxi” between the 
attacked directors and the institutional shareholders,173 and may put companies’ reputations at risk by 
sending a signal to the public that they have been poorly managed. As a result, some argued that 
intuitional shareholders may be cautious about using the derivative action mechanism as an activism 
strategy.174  
However, one is tempted to argue that this may be an arbitrary conclusion without a detailed analysis of 
the compensation and deterrence functions of derivative action. 175  The procedural rule of demand 
surrounding derivative actions has been adopted to strike a balance between improving shareholder 
remedies and preventing vexatious suits, which is particularly relevant for public companies. 176 
Shareholders are not entitled to file a lawsuit directly to the court to remedy an alleged harm without first 
making a written demand to the (board of) directors or the (board of) supervisors.177 
When assessing the importance and possibilities of continuing a claim the supervisor, the supervisory 
board, the board of directors or the executive director should consider issues such as the cost of the 
proceedings and potential damage to the company’s reputation before making a decision as to whether or 
not to pursue actions in court. In other words, this procedural requirement is “a nod to the principle of 
exhaustion of intra-corporate remedies”, 178  emphasising that an opportunity should be given to the 
company before the intervention of the Court because the company is the party that has suffered directly. 
If a company has other possible approaches to solve the problem, there is no need to resort to judicial 
resources if the wrong may be corrected by itself; this may also benefit the company.179 The demand rule 
is helpful for companies and their shareholders to make sure that they initially exhaust internal remedies. 
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Therefore, concerns for corporate reputation have been mitigated. Considering the screening process 
carried out by the director, the supervisor, the board of directors or the supervisory board, who have 
access to the resources of the company as well as information about the directors’ conduct and 
decisions,180 it is questionable to stipulate the shareholding percentage and period requirements at an 
exorbitantly harsh level. 
Although the fundamental interests of shareholders, especially those of institutional shareholders, would 
be successful and profitable investments rather than becoming mired in litigation, it could be argued that 
shareholders’ incentives to engage in litigation would likely increase with the dynamic cultural, judiciary, 
and legal framework transformation in China. With clarification of litigation fee-related issues through the 
Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Some Issues about the Application of the Company Law of 
the People’s Republic of China (IV), the trajectory of the popularity of derivative actions may rise; this 
was the Japanese experience, another jurisdiction that was also influenced by cultural constraints such as 
Confucian philosophy, with fundamental change starting from the Nikko Securities case decisions by the 
Tokyo High Court. This change in Japan came as an unexpected shock,181 and this could also occur in 
China.  
 
4. Shareholding Period Requirement 
Apart from the shareholding ownership percentage requirement, shareholders in JSLCs are also required 
to hold their shares for more than 180 consecutive days to be qualified as claimants for derivative 
action. 182  This 180-day rule was further clarified by the Supreme Court in 2006, stating that “the 
shareholding period of at least 180 days in succession specified in Article 151 of the Company Law shall 
have elapsed by the time the shareholder(s) institute(s) a suit in the people’s court”.183 This means the 
criteria of shareholder must have held 1% of the shares at the time the action is initiated. The Chinese 
company law does not require that the shareholders bringing the action must have been shareholders at 
the time the cause of action arose, and the US-origin “contemporary ownership rule”184 was rejected. 
These requirements are very similar to those embedded in the old Japanese Commercial Code.185 The 
provision is retained with an additional urgency requirement in the New Japanese Commercial Law, as an 
exception to bring derivative actions in urgent circumstances where failure to bring such a suit 
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immediately could result in irreparable damage to the company’s interests. 186  Chinese company law 
transplanted this Japanese approach. Additionally, it is the duty of a party to an action to provide evidence 
in support of his allegations according to Chinese Civil Procedure Law.187 Thus, it is the duty of the 
claimant, namely the shareholder(s), to provide that he, she or they have held their shares uninterrupted 
for 180 consecutive days. This does not come as a surprise, given the fact that to a certain extent China’s 
company law framework was modelled on that of its civil law neighbour countries and regions.  
In terms of the function of the shareholding period requirement and its exceptions, Hong and Goo hold 
a double-edged view and describe these as requirements that are “really helpful to deter unmeritorious 
suits given the heavy caseload in Chinese courts” from a positive side, but from the negative side they 
could “cause further loss to the company because the plaintiff shareholders have to wait for six months to 
bring the action without any exceptions”.188 They also think this transplant is “disappointing due to the 
ineffectiveness and problems of the Japanese approach”, 189  and the equivalent of the six-month 
shareholding period requirement in Japan has been criticised for its arbitrariness.190 
The shareholding period requirement was introduced to avoid malicious litigation and unnecessary 
distractions for directors, supervisors and senior managers in dealing with claims. It will avoid 
shareholders purchasing shares for the purpose of bringing litigation. It will also mitigate the risk that 
claimants may abuse derivative actions to threaten the plaintiff for shareholders’ own personal interests 
and illegitimate purposes. The emphasis here is on the length of the shareholding period, which has 
advantages in the clarity and convenience in application. However, it is a shame that there is no linkage 
between the shareholding period requirement and the timing of the directors’ infringement. This may 
contradict the purpose of imposing a shareholding period requirement in terms of avoiding people buying 
shares in order to bring a suit. Commentators have therefore suggested transplanting the US 
contemporary ownership model in order to remedy this defect.191  
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the contemporary ownership rule was rejected in the 
revised Chinese company law enforced in 2006. The reasons for the rejection, according to the 
explanation of the highest court on 10th May 2006, are as follows. First, the complexity of corporate 
misconduct and difficulties in defining the start date of directors’ infringements make it very costly for 
courts to apply the model in practice. Second, the mechanism should be compatible with corporations’ 
institutional development and judicial understanding of the derivative action system as a shareholder 
remedies with an accumulation of cases. It was argued that the underdevelopment of derivative action 
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makes stringent restrictions on such actions unnecessary, and a positive attitude should be adopted so 
that the mechanism may be conducted in a way that improves corporate governance and promotes 
shareholders’ awareness of executing their rights.192 However, after eleven years of enforcement, the 
trajectory of the quantity of cases involving JSLCs is rather disappointing and the application of the 
mechanism in LLCs has built experience in applying and referencing the tool in practice. Therefore, this 
may be a good opportunity to reconsider the feasibility and merits of adopting the rule.  
The contemporary ownership model requires that the demanding party was a shareholder at the time the 
cause of action arose. It may function as a more shareholder-friendly threshold than the 180 
uninterrupted days, and deals with issues such as impracticability and the unreasonable length of time for 
individual shareholders. The requirement could be applied in the courts for the “prevention of strike suits 
and speculative litigation”.193 On the other hand, the rule has also been criticised194 for being unfair to 
shareholders who detect directors’ misconduct giving rise to a lawsuit only after becoming 
shareholders.195 However, linking the committing of the alleged wrong to share ownership seems more 
shareholder-friendly than the 180-day period, while both mechanisms may not only avoid malicious 
litigation but also ensure that the plaintiff has sufficient self-interest in the outcome of the litigation to 
conduct a truly adversarial proceeding.196 The change is consistent with the purpose of removing legal 
procedural hurdles and building an investor-friendly and enabling shareholder lawsuit system in order to 
protect “its numerous unsophisticated public investors effectively”.197  
From a practical point of view, this standard of 180 days, together with thresholds on shareholding 
ownership, may seriously hinder the initiation of derivative suits in JSLCs. The duration requirement 
hinders shareholders from using the mechanism “in time” to stop the misconduct of directors and 
protect the interests of the company. Shareholders have to wait until the 180th day before they bring a 
lawsuit, even if they are convinced that the director has breached their duties. Liu discussed the 
irrationality of the shareholding period requirement in a hypothetical scenario. A shareholder purchases 
shares on the first day and detects evidence of the directors’ misbehaviour on the second day.198 Even if 
the shareholder holds more than 1% of the shares, they still need to “wait for” 178 days before they can 
bring a derivative action. During this 178-day period, they may witness additional misconducts from the 
board and reductions in the share price.199 However, what they are able to do in response to these 
misbehaviours is limited to encouraging the supervisory board or independent directors to start an 
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investigation, encouraging eligible shareholders to bring lawsuits, or using mass media to put directors 
under pressure.200 These approaches are only likely to be successful if those shareholders who are not 
eligible are influential, and the whole process can also be rather time-consuming, which may even take 
longer than 180 days. Lin further argued that these appeals may be ignored, and not all shareholders are 
able to access or use the media under such scenarios to put pressure on management.201  
Obviously, arguments of “exit remedies” may also be relevant here. In addition to the discussions 
presented in section 3.7, the exit strategy would not solve the fundamental problems to do with 
shareholders recovering damages and deterring directors from misbehaviour. Besides, some shareholders 
may simply wish to stay with the company in which they hold shares for a number of reasons, such as 
their belief in the company’s prospects in the long term, and the fact that “exit remedies” contradict 
shareholders’ intentions to invest in good faith, their willingness to engage in sustainable investment and 
their need to have their voices heard by challenging wrongdoers in order to hold them accountable. 
In relation to the secondary sources and with reference to recent data, Li argued that the consecutive 180-
day requirement would constitute a barrier for healthy derivative actions due to the quick turnover in 
China,202 which was demonstrated by Jin’s survey in which the average shareholding period in Chinese 
listed companies is four months.203 Peng claimed that 180 days is too long for individual shareholders in 
JSLCs, especially for listed ones, since the majority of individual shareholders invest for the profit 
available by selling their shares rather than for claiming dividends.204 She contended that the “harsh” 
shareholding period threshold would not benefit the effectiveness of the derivative action mechanism at 
its very early stage in China.205 It has been reported by the CSRC, taking the survey in 2015 as an example, 
that the average holding period is approximately 44 days for individual shareholders in listed 
companies.206 Looking at data for the Shenzhen Stock Exchange only, in 2012 the average holding period 
was approximately 39.1 days for individual shareholders in listed companies.207 From these two sets of 
data, the 180-day requirement apparently excludes the majority of the individual shareholders in listed 
companies. Therefore, the 180-day threshold creates an artificial barrier for individual shareholders.  
Indeed, for individual shareholders, the investment incentives of a large proportion of shareholders have 
been shown to be short-term and oriented by statistics. These investors, who have the goal of immediate 
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returns, are normally ignorant about the details and strategies of the companies and vote with their feet.208 
With limited information and insufficient incentives, it is extremely unlikely that these short-term trading 
shareholders would bring a derivative lawsuit against boards of directors and challenge their decisions.209 
Furthermore, the concept of “avoiding litigation” is deeply rooted in people’s minds based on the belief 
of “turning big problems into small ones and small problems into no problems at all”.210 In a social 
relationship like this, people sometimes choose to tolerate problems even if their interests are jeopardised. 
Therefore, under the current investment and legal environment, it is very hard for individual Chinese 
shareholders to file a lawsuit for the interests of the company and other shareholders. Even if they could, 
there remains the problem of their incentives to do so.  
However, even in light of the fact that minority shareholders are unlikely to bring a derivative action in 
China, the legislation itself should not put individual shareholders in an even more disadvantaged position 
by making it hard or impossible for individual shareholders to use the tool to question decisions of the 
board. Individual shareholders currently encounter particular difficulties when they seek redress against 
JSLCs. With limited information and incentives, the tool has only been used once in the last eleven years, 
but scandals such as Wanke and Geli demonstrated the strong necessity of shareholder litigation and 
supervision in listed companies in China; this is particularly important for those who are non-controlling 
shareholders.211 At the same time, the lack of cases in JSLCs is partly due to the availability of information 
and difficulties in applying shareholder remedy mechanisms such as derivative action in practice. It is 
clear that the “burden” of self-regulation, the investigatory power of the CSRC and indeed criminal and 
administrative law are insufficient to cope with fraud or mismanagement that may occur in JSLCs. A 
logical response here would thus be the necessity of proposing changes in the current company law in 
order to make derivative action more accessible for individual shareholders, focusing on less demanding 
shareholding period requirements for JSLCs. 
With the emphasis on shareholder protection, especially on the lack of voice, information and bargaining 
power, derivative action, as a system for shareholder remedy, should be designed in an enabling rather 
than hindering manner, and should give access to shareholders who sincerely care about corporate 
performance and directors’ decisions and behaviours. Derivative action is one of the most ingenious 
accountability mechanisms for larger formal organisations, and supervisors and accountees should include 
shareholders beyond powerful and well-informed ones. From the perspective of the sustainable 
development of derivative action in China, Wang argued that the shareholding period requirement should 
be abolished considering its very intermittent usage for shareholders in JSLCs after the enforcement of 
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CCL 2005.212 He argued that a shorter or no shareholding period threshold would not only allow more 
shareholders to join the ranks to supervise directors, but also reaffirm shareholders in their remedies, 
which is particularly important in China with its immature corporate governance and unbalanced 
structural shareholding ownership. 213  Reformers have made some agreements according to which a 
different timeframe should be introduced in listed companies and JSLCs, with three months for 
shareholders in non-listed JSLCs and an even shorter period for listed companies.214 The reason for the 
different treatment rests on the incentives for investment. It is claimed that the investment purpose for 
minority shareholders in JSLCs, especially listed companies, is to make a profit through stock market 
transactions. They tend to stay in the market for shorter periods of time with the purpose of getting an 
immediate return from their investment. Although the authors agree with the reason for shortening the 
shareholding period requirement, the “half price” approach, proposing a three-month period instead of 
six months, seems random with little theoretical and empirical support. As discussed above, this standard 
seems arbitrary, and it is difficult to set an exact bar for the shareholding period. A shorter or abolished 
shareholding period regimen seems to be the way forward.  
A comparatively new legislative approach in Germany, a civil law country, may give us some insightful 
suggestions, considering that China drafted its corporate law in a hybrid manner, employing rules and 
institutions borrowed from Germany and the US.215 The approach adopted in German corporate law in 
the new § 148 of the AktG in 2005 by the Gesetz zur Unternehmensintegrität und Modernisierung des 
Anfechtungsrechts in Germany sets the threshold for shareholders in JSLCs at only a shareholding 
percentage or quantity requirement for JSLCs (0.1% shareholding percentage in China as proposed in 
Section 3), with no requirement in terms of the shareholding period.216 In addition, if the legislators in 
China are convinced of this approach for Chinese JSLCs, the rule that requires the shareholders to have 
held the shares before they learned about the alleged breaches of duty or alleged damage from a 
publication should be also adopted to avoid malicious litigation, as justified in Section 4.217  
 
5. Experiences from Other Jurisdictions  
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The imbalance in derivative actions between LLCs and JSLCs in China has not been evident in every 
jurisdiction. Obviously, more well-adjusted figures in other jurisdictions could be regarded as the result of 
multiple factors. Therefore, the figures for derivative actions in public companies in other jurisdictions 
should not be exclusively regarded as the result of an absence of or lower shareholding period/percentage. 
However, considering the sharp difference in the figures between LLCs and JSLCs in China, the relatively 
high shareholding percentage requirement may have a causal link with the unpopular application of 
derivative action in JSLCs in China. In this section, factors such as mitigated thresholds through legal 
reforms, litigation costs and court permission as thresholds will be discussed in a few jurisdictions’ 
context to offer the reader a more comprehensive view of the hurdles and incentives for initiating 
derivative actions. It is not feasible and not the theme of the article for the authors to illuminate every 
reason for the comparative popularity of this mechanism in other jurisdictions. The mechanism of 
derivative action is designed, in public companies, to work with securities markets, under conditions of 
media scrutiny and public enforcement to protect the interests of companies through the empowerment 
of shareholder voices.218 If a jurisdiction chooses to introduce the mechanism, efforts should be made to 
make it work effectively in both LLCs and JSLCs.  
In Japan, where the shareholding percentage is not a requirement for bringing a derivative action, 
derivative actions involving publicly held companies have been more numerous than those involving 
closed companies since 1993.219 It is reported that 119 derivative actions were brought against listed 
companies in Japan from 1993 to 2009.220 This increase could be the consequence of multiple factors. For 
an instance, the derivative claim cost is fixed 13,000 Yen for the target of the litigation does not exceed 
1.6 million Yen, by deeming derivative actions to be non-property claims. 221 Historically, the sliding scale 
system has proven to be a barrier to shareholder derivative claims in Japan.222 In addition to the cost issue, 
the elevated success rate after 1993 (before this date it was very low, with only a single case where the 
plaintiff won) and enhanced awareness of shareholders’ rights are also regarded as reasons for the 
popularity of actions, including actions in public companies.223   
In Korea, a shareholder requirement of 0.01% is regarded as “low enough” to ensure that derivative suits 
are feasible.224 It has been reported that over half of the fifty-five derivative actions filed in Korea 
between 1997 and 2010 involved public companies.225  
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In common law countries directors of public companies may be involved as defendants in derivative 
actions. Provisions for the creation and procedures of statutory derivative action have been enacted in 
these countries. Just as in Japan, many reasons could contribute to the numbers of derivative action cases. 
In the US many cases involve public companies, based on the empirical research of Tompson and 
Thomas.226 Derivative actions against listed firms have been regarded as a common issue historically, 
based on research on a sample of 535 public corporations.227 The high percentage of settlement in the US 
due to the structure of indemnification rights and insurance coverage is another reason for the popularity 
of derivative suits in the US. Furthermore, derivative action in the US is argued as a lawyer-driven 
(litigation market-oriented) mechanism. They do not normally have any shares in the company, and 
therefore it is irrational to have lawyers initiating actions based on financial incentives.228 The general rule 
in the US is that each party is responsible for his own attorney’s fees. Irrespective of the result of the 
action, both parties bear their own legal costs under the US Rules of Civil Procedure.229 Moreover, the 
“contingency fee arrangement” is regarded as common practice, where the fees are fixed at a percentage no 
higher than thirty percent of the amount of the damages claimed as the result of a successful litigation.230  
 
In the limited evidence from the UK, three cases, namely Bridge v Daley231, Eckerle v Wickeder Westfalenstahl 
GmbH 232  and BNP Paribas SA v Open Joint Stock Company Russian Machines, 233  have involved public 
companies. The relatively healthy ratio with public companies may also have a connection with many 
factors, such as litigation costs. The “indemnity order” established that a company should indemnify a 
shareholder defendant in a derivative suit since the shareholder acts on behalf of the company and the 
company is the direct beneficiary, even, in fact especially, where the litigation is ultimately unsuccessful.234 
The decision is reflected in the Civil Procedure rule where the court has the power at a permission 
hearing to order the company to indemnify the successful shareholder in relation to his or her costs.235 
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The cost of a proposed action is regarded, in the UK, as a practical hurdle and a major disincentive to 
launching a derivative action.236 The Law Commission also asserted that the inclusion of the power to 
provide for an indemnity was a significant incentive to shareholders to initiate proceedings.237 In Australia, 
four of the thirty-one concerned companies were publicly held companies during the period from March 
2000 (the introduction of Part 2E1A) to 12 August 2005.238 Again, many issues could be also involved 
here, including, for example, the broader range of applicants; former members and officers of the 
company are allowed to bring derivative proceedings as well as members.239   
 
6. Conclusion  
 
The mechanism of derivative action is one of the most important legal tools, working side by side with 
statutory oppression remedies, 240  and it has been a staple of corporate law in most common law 
jurisdictions. 241  Overall, the CCL 2005 introduced the derivative regime into China as a notable 
improvement to the previous version of company law, hoping that it would contribute to corporate 
governance and establish an investor-friendly legal and business environment.242 However, this regime is 
far from perfect, and this paper attempts to point out its inaccessibility by clarifying some thorny issues 
regarding the eligibility of shareholder claimants. The standing requirements applying exclusively to JSLCs 
are, from our research, a double-edged sword as they deter meritorious litigation even as they also prevent 
vexatious suits. The most important element of the standing requirement is to locate an appropriate level 
that makes derivative action effective, applicable and functional. This differential treatment was based 
upon the consideration that the “plight of minority shareholders in the limited liability company is 
generally graver than that of their counterparts in the joint stock limited liability company”.243 After all, 
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the derivative action scheme was originally introduced to be an effective weapon to deter misconduct 
among management personnel, rather than just being window dressing for JSLCs or a useful mechanism 
for LLCs alone.  
Thus far the limited use of the mechanism in JSLCs requires us to reconsider the sense and 
appropriateness of this bar on the qualification of a claimant in JSLCs. Analyses reveal that most of the 
derivative lawsuits to date have involved private companies. In the meantime, it is hard for shareholders 
to invoke this action in JSLCs, especially in listed ones. While some doubt the willingness of institutional 
investors to initiate derivative action in JSLCs, our analysis has shown that conventional institutional, legal, 
and cultural barriers for institutional investors to actively engage in litigations are diminishing, and their 
incentives to engage in derivative action would likely increase in the future with the dynamic cultural, 
judiciary, and legal framework transformation in China. Our empirical analysis further discovered that the 
shareholding percentage threshold imposed by Article 151 of CCL 2013 has been a big barrier in this 
regard, pragmatically and problematically excluding a large proportion of even the top ten shareholders. 
Modifications of the shareholding ownership percentage and the shareholding period in China are 
proposed with the aim of making the derivative action mechanism more effective, by making the 
threshold more rational and consistent considering the current securities market structure in China.244   
A proposal of at least 0.1% shareholding percentage and a revised or even abolished shareholding period 
requirement with a contemporary ownership rule is suggested in order to make derivative action in China 
more effective, and to ensure that the regime is utilised more systematically in JSLCs instead of being 
mere window dressing. The goals of this proposed enlarged provenance of shareholder claimants for 
derivative action are consistent with the initial legislative purpose of imposing thresholds for shareholders 
in JSLCs. The proposed changes to the qualification requirements will entitle and encourage more 
participation from shareholders to challenge and inspect directors’ (mis)conducts and decisions, and they 
will be more likely to be responsible and act in a fiduciary manner.245 As a result, the boards are expected 
to be more accountable to their companies. It is believed that these suggested reforms will not only 
promote the suitability and enabling character of Chinese Company Law, but also enhance corporate 
governance values such as fairness, accountability and effectiveness. The eligibility-related problems 
identified and discussed in this article are timely, important, and urgently need to be addressed by 
legislators in order to make derivative actions into a useful and functional mechanism for shareholders in 
JSLCs. The pragmatic impact of lowered thresholds would merit more empirical research, particularly if 
the reform suggestions in this article are adopted by the government.   
Based on other jurisdictions’ experiences and empirical analyses on the situation in China, one sees the 
goal of the proposed reform of derivative action as to maintain a suitable balance between improving 
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shareholder remedies and preventing vexatious suits, particularly in relation to public companies.246 A 
rational and balanced threshold (lower than current levels, as we will suggest in this article) will deter 
immoral malfeasance by directors and hold them accountable for corporate decisions. A more effective 
and enabling derivative action mechanism will also put less pressure on the CSRC, which uses its 
regulatory powers to facilitate the settling of compensation issues out of court through administrative 
sanctions. 247  Coupled with proposed changes in law, it might also be helpful to set up a “China’s 
Investor’s Association” to provide investor education and support investor litigation, financed by a public 
fund to ensure its independence and impartiality, so that the shareholders in China will be better equipped 
with knowledge and information concerning how and why to bring such actions. 248  
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